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Abstract 
This study was based on survey that involved small, medium as well as large enterprises 
which were engaging in buyer-supplier business to business relations in Tanzania. The aim 
was to use some key dimensions from TCA as well as RCT, and RDT, and test some existing 
relations from developed economies literature and compare it with the outcomes in 
developing economies and Tanzania in particular. Key concepts which were analyzed in this 
study are buyer perceived opportunism, vertical coordination and formal contractual 
agreements. 
Data collection mainly used primary sources and very small part used secondary sources. 
Primary data collection used structured and closed questionnaires, which were distributed to 
buying firms as the respondents. 
Quantitative data analysis was a major form of analysis used. It involved descriptive statistics 
such as percentage, means and standard deviation. In evaluating the essence of variables used 
for the analysis, the study used factor analysis together with KMO and Bartlett‟s test. On the 
other hand the analysis for testing the predicted relations involved the use of correlation 
matrix as well as bivariate and multivariate data analysis methods.   
In this study buyer asset specificity was found to increase level of buyer perceived as was 
predicted, while the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity 
were as well significant and consistent with predictions. On the other hand contractual 
flexibility was found to have a significant positive impact on vertical coordination in 
accordance to hypothesis. The negative impact of environmental uncertainty and the positive 
impact of buyer asset specificity on formal contractual agreement were found to be significant 
as predicted but a huge negative effect of buyer dependence on this relationship was also 
supported and it turns out that this variable is a strong predictor of formal contractual 
agreement far more than buyer asset specificity. Most of the tested relations did not reveal 
significant differences between developed economies TCA empirical findings and those from 
developing economies, except for insignificant impact of environmental uncertainty on 
vertical coordination, suggesting the relevance of TCA in predicting these concept in 
developing economies as well and Tanzania in particular. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.0 Background of the study 
Transaction cost dimensions have been observed to have some external or firm specific 
influential factors in determining relations. Biggs & Shah (2006) noted that limited 
information about business and consumers, poor communications, and the fact that many 
small business firms do not have fixed business sites, may impact negatively their relations 
with supplier especially in credit offerings.  The author noted also that at early stages of 
industrialization because of few firms, and inadequate market information, together with high 
transport costs, persuades firms to make efforts to maintain their existing relationships 
because they recognize that they are locked in to some extent with existing business partner 
because of high search and screening costs.   
Sjøquist (1996) noted that institutions shape the way firms responds. This can lead to higher 
or lower transaction costs to firms. The implication here is that the institutional structures in a 
given country might influence some findings on the relationships observed in TCA dimension 
or other related theories.  The argument is supported with findings from Luis et al (2009) 
study in China where they found a negative relationship between opportunism and partnership 
performance to be significant contrary to what most of western literatures suggested of a 
positive relationship. In the authors‟ conclusive remarks they pointed out that contrary to 
TCA arguments formal contracts play less role in China, and hence research in emerging 
markets should therefore consider important institutional factors that may draw a theoretical 
boundary to TCA framework.   
Other studies in china like that of Standifird & Mashall (2000), have established that quaxi 
(cultivation of personal relations) is important element of business dealings, than in western 
and it has found to be a key determinant in business transactions in china. Tanzania is 
considered to be a developing economy or in other words an emerging economy and hence 
the findings here might have significant implications there. The institutional and cultural 
settings are different from western countries and might be different from China or Tanzania as 
well. The Focus of this study is not to find out issues related to institutional settings and their 
effects on TCA, but is to establish whether the existing finding in the TCA literature do still 
2 
 
hold in a different business to business relations setting in a different institutions. Off course 
not all relations but some. There are rare or no existing studies related to business to business 
relations on TCA dimension in Tanzania, but there are very few studies that have looked on 
business to customer relations, or individual to business. It is hard to replicate the findings of 
these studies in comparison to western studies on the same area because the objectivity and 
the study setting were heavily on more agricultural versus cooperative relations, a setting 
which is not feasible in most of developed economies. Example studies by Nelson & Temu 
(2002) observed TCA dimensions in Tanzania but this was in coffee industry, a relation 
observed was between the cooperative or business buyer versus an individual seller who is a 
farmer.  
The argument for having less studies on this area of business to business relations in Tanzania 
might be due to country‟s history from independent in 1961. The focus on ownership of 
means of production was shifted from private to government ownership in the beginning of 
1967 after a declaration which was signed in Arusha. The declaration established a policy so 
called Africa Socialism system (ujamaa) and self reliance.  The policy emphasized on country 
inward looking for self sufficiency instead of relying on external countries. After critical 
failure of the policy, evidenced with a huge decline of economy followed by IMF and World 
Bank pressure, the country decided to launch Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1986. 
This was followed by Economic and Social Action program between 1990 and 1992, focusing 
on empowering social sectors in the country which were neglected.  After a transfer of power 
in 1995, the country took a completely new turn by emphasizing on private sector ownership, 
improvement of investment climate to investors, investment in economic infrastructures as 
well as empowering and motivating small and medium enterprises through loosening the tight 
policies. It is from this time where most of private ownership enterprises were established and 
the literature was mostly focusing on these enterprises more than the relations between them 
and other large ones.  
The concepts which this study is focusing include buyer perceived opportunism, vertical 
coordination and formal contractual agreement.  
Perceived opportunism has been having mixed result when there is asset specificity. This was 
noted by Demsetz Harold (1991). Rokklan et al (2003) also observed inherent dilemma on the 
impact of asset specificity on perceived opportunism.  On his findings he revealed that asset 
specificity have a potential for promoting or reducing opportunism. I found it being important 
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to take this as my first part of focus in this study.  The impact of buyer asset specificity and 
supplier asset specificity in relation to buyer perceived opportunism have rarely being 
examined at least in developing economies like Tanzania in particular.  
On the other hand vertical coordination as one of non-integrative governance mode have 
being studied using environmental uncertainty, and other dimensions like asset specificity.  
Nakhla (2003), linked the vertical coordination, flexibility and contracts in the following 
statement „‟ In situations of interdependence of activities and of uncertainty, a conflict can be 
shown between coordination based on a “strict” contractual approach and “flexible” modes of 
commitment that take advantage of the increase in information but may involve high 
coordination costs.”.  
 
Ivens (2005), made his study on service industry but he found a positive relation between 
flexibility and supplier vertical coordination (long-term orientation)  
Frequent changing environment are known to affect widely the contractual relations 
especially in developing economies. It was noted by Noordewier et al (1990) that it is not the 
degree to which agreements have been tightly worded ex ante that is of concern rather, it is 
the reaction toward change requests that matters.  
The study will also be interested in examining whether environmental uncertainty has any link 
to formal contractual relations, but asset specificity and buyer dependence will be introduced 
as well in this model 
Testing of above relations are also relevant for at least by taking into account that such studies 
have not been performed in my country, apart from adding to an existing literature related to 
this subject. Ivens (2005) found a negative impact of environmental uncertainty on formal 
contractual agreement, but with respect to asset specificity Buvik and Reve (2002) found a 
positive relationship between asset specificity and formal contractual agreement. Further the 
impact of dependence has a strong negative effect on contractual agreement than asset 
specificity. This was also observed in the study buy Buvik and Reve (2002). 
The Tanzania SME policy of 2003 which is currently operating now, noted that the SME 
contributes about 1/3 of the total country GDP. Triodos facet report (2007) noted SMEs in 
Tanzania contributes about 30% of country GDP. These findings were also supported by 
Tanzania revenue regulatory authority. By 2008 Tanzania revenue regulatory noted that there 
were about 300,503 registered SMEs which were about 69.3% of the taxpayers‟ population in 
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the country. Large part of Tanzania business sector is dominated by a huge number of formal 
and informal SMEs together with few large enterprises. The distribution sector in Tanzania is 
highly dominated by SMEs which work together with these few large enterprises. In any 
study setting in Tanzania which deals with producer-distributor relations will not be able to 
avoid this sector. Most studies that have examined TCA concept have not included at least 
small and medium business which is normally a huge dominance part of the supply chain in 
developing countries, and Tanzania in particular. This study though will not entirely look on 
small business; it has included them as a part of respondent so as to observe if they have any 
significant differences with other large sized manufacturing businesses firms when it comes to 
TCA empirical findings.  
 
1.1 Research objective 
1.1.1 General objective 
To examine the concepts of buyer perceived opportunism, vertical coordination and formal 
contractual agreements. 
1.1.2 Specific objectives 
To define and measure the concepts of perceived buyer opportunism, vertical coordination 
and formal contractual agreements 
To define and measure asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, performance ambiguity, 
contractual flexibility, environmental uncertainty and buyer dependence  
To examine and analyze a direct link between buyer and supplier asset specificity and buyer 
perceived opportunism 
To analyze moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity in the 
relationship above 
To examine and analyze a direct influence of contractual flexibility on vertical coordination 
To examine and analyze the influence of environmental uncertainty and asset specificity on 
vertical coordination 
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To analyze the impact of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty on formal 
contractual agreements 
To analyze the influence of buyer dependence on formal contractual agreement 
1.2 Research questions: 
How do the concepts of supplier and buyer asset specificity, buyer perceived opportunism, 
behavioral uncertainty, performance ambiguity, contractual flexibility, formal contractual 
relations, supplier and buyer dependence, environmental uncertainty defined and measured. 
What is the relationship between buyer and supplier asset specificity and buyer perceived 
opportunism? 
Does the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity in the 
relationship above exist? 
What is the impact of contractual flexibility on vertical coordination? 
 What is the influence of environmental uncertainty and asset specificity on vertical 
coordination? 
What is the impact of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty on formal contractual 
agreements? 
What is the influence of buyer dependence on formal contractual agreement? 
 
1.3 Significance of the study 
The study will add value in the existing literature of the TCA dimensions as well as RCT and 
RDT through bringing a new perspective and a new setting with respect to developing 
economies.  
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1.4 About Tanzania 
Location 
Tanzania is a country in the eastern part of Africa with a latitude and longitude reading of 6° 
00' South and 35° 00' east. Tanzania's capital (Dar es Salaam) sits in between 6° 48' South 
latitude and 39° 17' East longitude. 
The map below indicates some of the neighboring countries with Tanzania. On the North east 
it is bordering with Kenya, while North West it borders with Uganda. Rwanda and Burundi 
together with Democratic Republic of Congo are on the western side of Tanzania, while on 
the East there is Indian Ocean. Countries on the south includes Zambia, Malawi and 
Mozambique.  
Figure 1 
 
Source: (Facts book, 2009) 
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Area 
Tanzania has a total area of 947,300 sq km, where 885,800sq km is land and 61,500sq km is 
water 
 
GDP per Capita  
Tanzania has a GDP per Capital of $1,400 (this is by 2009 country estimates) 
 
GDP Composition by Sector 
Agriculture covers 26.6%, where Industry covers 22.6% and Service sector covers 50.8%. 
Again this data is by 2009 country estimates. 
 
Population  
Tanzania population according to 2009 UN estimates reaches about 43.7 million 
 
Capital  
Dodoma is official capital city, but Dar es salaam is commercial city. 
Business sector performance 
Small business contributes by estimates about 30% of GDP 
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1.5 SMEs in Tanzania and Related Aspects. 
Table below is obtained from Tanzania SME policy of 2002, which categorized small and 
medium enterprises from micro, small, medium and large enterprises. Those with 1-4 
employees and annual turnover of up to 5 million (Tshs) are categorized into micro 
enterprises, where those with 5-49 employees and annual turnover of up to 200 million are in 
the group of small enterprises. For those firms with 50-99 employees and annual turnover of 
more than 200 million up to 800 million are on the category of medium enterprises, while 
those of more than 100 employees and annual turnover of more than 800 million (Tshs) are 
categorized as large enterprises.  
 
TABLE 1 
Category Employees  Capital Investment in Machinery (Tshs) 
Micro enterprise 1 – 4 Up to 5 mil.  
 
Small enterprise 5 – 49 Above 5 mil. To 200 mil. 
 
Medium 
enterprise 
50 – 99 Above 200mil.to 800 mil. 
 
Large enterprise 100 + Above 800 mil. 
 
  Source: (Tanzania Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2002) 
Though data base related to new registered business in Tanzania is not updated frequently, 
there are agencies which can be used to obtain such information depending on type and 
objective of the study. For example, if you only concentrate with small enterprises, then there 
is agency dealing with small industries development abbreviated by SIDO (Small industry 
development organization). This agency deals with enabling startup and ongoing small firms 
in reaching their manufacturing objectives in all areas of production, packing, sales, 
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marketing and consultancy. Tanzania Revenue Authority updates monthly the profiles on 
amount of tax collected and from which sector, though these reports do not provide updated 
information on new registered businesses and on which category. Such information can be 
accessed through direct contact with this institution. Statistical reports related to broad areas 
in the country can also be accessed in a national statistical agency known as Tanzania Bureau 
of statistics. There are also many business networks centred on small business in Tanzania 
because the banking sector does not normally trust small business, so they prefer them to be 
organized in groups. The low reliability of small businesses to financial institutions in the 
country is due to their less proper financial record keeping and other risks associated with 
poor managerial capabilities. The larger the business, and the more the formality in terms of 
managerial structure, the higher it enjoys support from both government and financial 
institutions.   
Government of Tanzania since 1995 carried out huge restructuring of business sector, by 
focusing on abolishing barriers for establishment of business such as government 
bureaucracies and easing the licensing policy. It was from such reforms that there was a huge 
number of newly estblished enterprises in the country. The pick of these reforms was on 2006 
when government decided to borrow small and medium business agencies directly because of 
obstacles they were facing from government sector. Though this was a first time move where 
government decided to put out billions of shillings to small business, the experience has not 
been quite a happy one at least to the government because it has not been able to secure this 
money back. 
Most of these small and medium enterprises are not in the manufacturing sector, and if they 
are in this sector it is always in a small scale and less international focused. The large 
enterprises are the ones which are heavily centred in this sector because they have enough 
capital. In such type of business setting, the small and medium enterprises cooperated with 
large enterprises in distribution terms or supplying them with materials. In the event of 
supplying to large enterprises the small firms do not have such capability of ensure continuity, 
and in this regard there are always more than one firm supplying to large enterprise. Also 
small and medium businesses have their own business to business relations depending on the 
needs of each one. 
Studies related to business to business relations in the context of TCA dimensions, are quite 
rare if they don‟t exist in Tanzania literature. Most TCA studies are between businesses to 
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private individuals particularly the farmers. Example Nelson and Temu (2002) conducted a 
study on Institutional adjustment and Transaction cost in the context of coffe farming system 
by comparing TCA before and after liberalization. This finding suggested that TCA was 
almost the same in both periods. Staal S, et al (1997) also had a study related to TCA on small 
diary holders in east Africa. The findings from the study revealed that the transaction cost for 
small diary holders were quite higher than those in developed nations. Author argued this to 
be so because of transport and communication difficulties together with demand uncertainties. 
The study also revealed a difference in transaction cost between small and larger firms when 
it comes to TCA, implying that large firms have a power in lowering the transaction costs. On 
other side this study also noted the role of collective organizations (cooperative, self helping 
groups etc) in reducing transaction costs. These findings I suggest will be quite different from 
western settings. Also the implication drawn here can be supported by work of Bigss & Shah 
(2006), where they said ‟‟In the presence of economic instability, market imperfections, and 
weak government provided legal institutions, the power of the African business network rests 
partly on the exchange of information through it and on group enforcement, and partly on the 
ready ability of the group to support transactions that benefit from relation-based governance, 
such as financing, sales, and distribution to customers outside the immediate neighborhood‟‟. 
Same authors found out some differences between Zimbabwe and Tanzania small industrial 
firms. With western oriented small industrial firms in Zimbabwe (owned by western by then 
before crisis), were found to be different from those in Tanzania (which were more 
indigenous) by having less transaction cost in terms of receiving more credit from suppliers.  
 
The literature above has more to do with individual farmers versus firms or cooperatives, with 
less on industrial firms or business to business relations. Also the results from most of the 
studies mentioned above have some differences with western literature due to some 
institutional and objective differences. Businesses to business relations studies with respect to 
TCA are quite scarce if they do not exist in Tanzania as I have mentioned before. The reasons 
might be due to country history, which I highlighted more clearly on the background section.  
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1.6 Statement of the problem. 
TCA has a rich of findings with respect to buyer opportunism, vertical coordination as well as 
formal contractual agreements, but most of the analysis and predictions in the current 
literature have used firms in developed economies and more specific in industrial business to 
business relations. This study intends to take a complete new setting and new environment, 
but with the assumption that the predictions from the literature regarding the variables to be 
examined are relevant in this setting though many factors beyond this study horizon will 
likely influence the findings.  
 
1.7 Organization of the study 
This study will be divided into six parts or items. The division is as follows;  
Theoretical review of TCA, RCT and RDT will be covered in chapter two and three.  Chapter 
two will concentrate on TCA and chapter three will be focusing on reviewing theories of RCT 
and RDT. On the other hand a conceptual framework and hypothesis will be covered in 
chapter four, while methodology of the study will be covered in chapter five. Chapter six will 
be dedicated on showing findings and the results from the analysis and chapter seven will 
discuss these findings, drawing theoretical and policy implications together with making 
conclusions.
12 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
  
Transaction cost adopts a comparative contractual approach to the study of economic 
organization in which the transaction is made the basic unit of analysis and the details of 
governance structures and human actors are brought under review (Williamson & Winter, 
1993). Transaction costs have been broken down into two main categories by willimson, 
(1985), where he distinguished ex ante and ex-post categories. With respect to ex ante, there 
are costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding the agreement.  
In addition ex ante inter-firm safeguards can sometimes be fashioned to signal credible 
commitments and restore integrity to transactions. On the other side ex post costs of 
contracting take several forms. These include (1) the mal-adaption cost incurred when 
transactions drift out of alignment , (2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made 
to correct ex post misalignments, (3) the setup and running costs associated with the 
governance structures, and lastly the bonding costs of affecting secure commitment.  
Also one of the key remark that Williamson (1985) made in relation to these transaction costs 
is that, in addressing them we need to do it simultaneously not sequentially, meaning that at 
the time of establishing contractual relations the parties to the agreement should not forget ex 
post costs while only focusing on ex ante, thinking they will address the other later. 
Internalizing a transaction substitutes market forces with an organizational control and 
coordination system, which both serves to safeguard specific assets as well as facilitate 
adaptation to uncertainty (Heide 1995). 
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Transaction cost analysis is relevant in determining the mode of governance. Most of studies 
have tried to examine the extent in which transaction cost elements guides a firm toward 
choosing market, hierarchy or an intermediate form. With market mode it means all exchange 
takes place in the market, while hierarchy or intermediate form relates to certain amount of 
contractual agreement between supplier and buyer. In a general sense, transaction cost theory 
views governance in terms of designing particular mechanisms for supporting economic 
transactions (Heide 1994). 
2.1 ASSUMPTIONS OF TCA 
Key assumptions under Transaction cost theory has been bounded rationality (parties in the 
contract has limited abilities and rationality in foreseeing future), and opportunism (actor 
intentionally hide some information relevant in the transaction for sake of serving their own 
interests at the expense of the partner in the relationship/agreement). Box below highlights 
more on the literature description on the concept of opportunism   
Box 1: Opportunism 
Opportunism extends the conventional assumption that the economic agents are guided by 
considerations of self-interest to make allowance strategic behavior (Williamson 1975). 
Opportunism poses a transactional hazard to the extent that a relationship is supported by 
idiosyncratic investments dedicated to the exchange partner (Stump & Heide 1996: 432). 
Williamson (1975: 27) commented that opportunism is to be distinguished from both 
stewardship behavior and instrumental behavior. Whereas stewardship behavior involves trust 
relation in which the word of a party can be taken as his bond, instrumental behavior is more 
neutral mode in which there is no necessary self-awareness that the interests of a party can be 
furthered by stratagems of any sort (Williamson; 1975). When there are dedicated assets in 
the investment, the level of opportunism will likely shift at least the perceived opportunism. 
This idea has been supported by Demsetz Harold (1991) and Rokklan et a (2003).These 
studies connected asset specificity with opportunism but the predictions regarding the 
direction of effect has in most cases showed mixed results. 
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Consequences resulted of bounded rationality is linked to uncertainty which in turn can either 
be external environmental uncertainty that cannot be foreseeing before the contract or 
behavioral uncertainty that linked with problems in measuring performance of partner. Again 
the two concepts can be viewed in terms of external uncertainty or internal uncertainty, where 
the later related to problems in measuring partner performance, and the former is related to 
adaptation problems. Most studies determining mode of governance have mainly used these 
two components. 
 
On the other hand opportunism can lead to adverse selection in an event where one part to the 
contract has hidden important information. Information Asymmetry is a term that is coined in 
explaining opportunism and it implies that each part to the contract has specific information 
which is not known to the other part. Again this can leads to moral hazard in an event when 
this opportunism has occurred ex post i.e. after the contract, and this can be more active form.  
For complete overview of Transaction cost analysis, one has to add the third dimension of it, 
which is asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to scenario where the supplier has made 
some specific investments in the relationship and at that moment the safeguarding problem 
arises on these assets. The event where the assets cannot be valuable outside the relationship, 
creates a hold up problem where the supplier in the relationship need to agree with these 
demands from the buyer. The frequency of transaction is the fourth dimension of TCA and it 
is mostly linked in analyzing where market or hierarchy is relevant form of governance given 
the level of frequency in the transaction. 
 
2.2 DIMENSIONS OF TRANSACTIONS 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) made a category of Transaction cost with respect to their origin. 
The categories highlighted based on direct and opportunity cost as well.  These included 
Specific investment, environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. In this reflection 
behavioral uncertainty is linked to performance evaluation problems. Agency theory has been 
closely associated with TCA. For instance classification of transaction costs was broken down 
into coordination and motivation costs as proposed by Milgrom & Roberts (1992). 
Opportunism is highly reflected in association to motivation cost. Opportunism in turn is 
associated with information asymmetry. 
15 
 
For the sake of analysis, I will combine the two classifications, highlighting on specific issues 
in each. Where there are other concepts linked to a dimension, I will highlight them in a box. 
For example behavioral uncertainty has been linked to performance measurement problem as 
well as information asymmetry. When these concepts appear in the text of behavioral 
uncertainty, they will be shown in a box that follows the text on the subject.  
 
2.2.1 Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity can be defined as the “durable investments that are undertaken in support of 
particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best 
alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely 
terminated” (Williamson 1985:5). Author continued to argue that Cooperating partners invest 
in specific assets for a partnership out of task needs and goodwill.  
Without purporting to be exhaustive, asset specificity distinctions of five kinds have been 
made: (1) site specificity, as where successive stations are located in a cheek-by-jowl relation 
to each other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses; (2) physical asset 
specificity, such as specialized dies that are required to produce a component; (3) human asset 
specificity that arises in a learning-by doing fashion; (4) dedicated assets, which are discrete 
investments in general purpose plan that are made at the behest of a particular customer; and 
(5) brand name capital (Williamson; 1989:144). 
From a transaction cost perspective the more specific the inputs required in the firm's 
production process, the less likely these products or services will be satisfactorily available 
from the market (Chandler et al, 2009). 
TCA predicts that exchange relationships with high asset specificity tend to use more formal 
contracts for governance when the transaction cannot be internalized (Lui et al 2009) 
Specific assets involve human assets that cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive 
value should contracts be prematurely terminated (Williamson 1985). It is also important to 
note that asset specificity does not entail only human assets but could range from various 
types depending on the nature of the relationship and business. For example an accounting 
firm might use human asset specificity, but manufacturing firm might commit new production 
unit etc. Transaction-specific investments involve physical or human assets that are dedicated 
to a particular relationship and cannot be redeployed easily (Heide 1994:73). 
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Asset specificity has reference to the degree to which an asset can be deployed to alternative 
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value (Williamson 1989). Author 
also noted this relates to sunk cost. 
 
Transactions involving high levels of specific assets create the opportunity for quasi-rents to 
be appropriated or „held up‟ by opportunistic buyers or suppliers (Leiblein & Miller 2003). 
Perhaps more important, asset specificity may reduce the non-opportunistic costs of 
maintaining vertically separated organizations (Demsetz 1991). There is less need to manage 
(through vertical integration) the coordination of assets when they are „‟dedicated‟‟ to specific 
uses, as they are likely to be under conditions of asset specificity.  
Special-purpose assets are important because they eliminate competitive pressure, the major 
basis of the market superiority argument (Anderson 1985). Knowing they are difficult to 
replace, suppliers may become opportunistic or inflexible. 
 
The other alternative approach noted by (Stump and Heide 1996) on how to manage the 
problem caused by specific investments is to design an incentive structure that discourages 
opportunistic behavior by the other party. 
Transaction-specific assets can be argued to constitute dependence, because their presence 
makes exchange partners irreplaceable or replaceable only at a cost (Heide 1994) 
 
 
2.2.2 Behavioural uncertainty 
Behavioral assumption is that human agents are given to opportunism, which is a seep 
condition of self-interest seeking that contemplates guile (Williamson 1991). Self interest and 
contemplation of guile has been closely associated with problems related to monitoring or 
performance measurements. This was noted by Williamson (1979) when he argued 
‟Behavioral uncertainty arises from the difficulties associated with the monitoring of the 
contractual performance of an exchange partner when bounded rationality is present „‟.  
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He also pointed out that behavioral uncertainty is expected to increase the problem of 
performance evaluation and induce measurement costs, performance evaluation and 
adjustment costs. Same line of argument was supported by Rindfleisch & Heide (1997), but 
he also added that to the extent that a party‟s true level of performance is not readily apparent, 
direct measurement costs may need to be incurred. Text box below describe more on the 
concept of performance ambiguity. 
 
 
Box 2: Performance ambiguity 
 
Performance ambiguity represents a disincentive to invest in a comprehensive evaluation of 
supplier ability. Performance measurement problem by its definition is well associated with 
behavioral uncertainty. Williamson, (1979), argued behavioral uncertainty to be associated 
closely with monitoring performance. Transaction cost analysis claims that high levels of 
behavioral uncertainty increase the costs of evaluating the performance of exchange partner 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997:46). Bounded relationality also has been one of the key 
assumptions related to performance ambiguity.  
With respect to this assumption Rindfleisch & Heide (1997:45) noted that the antecedents of 
the performance evaluation problem are bounded rationality and behavioral uncertainty. 
Performance ambiguity has also been linked with other dimensions such as opportunism and 
asset specificity together with environmental uncertainty. In most relations that involve 
behavioral uncertainty, the concept of performance ambiguity has been linked hand in hand. 
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With relation to information asymmetry, Rindfleisch & Heide (1997) argued that behavioral 
uncertainty causes difficulty because of ex-post information asymmetry regarding task 
performance. Text below gives more description on information asymmetry. 
 
Box 3: Information asymetry 
Wathne & Heide (2004), noted that to the extent that information asymmetry exists in a 
relationship, it is possible for a party to act opportunistically without being detected. 
‘’Asymmetric information represents an uneven distribution of information during a 
transaction. This difference in information can put one party at an advantage while placing 
the other at disadvantage’’ (Waseem et al, 2008:3). 
 
Information asymmetry may exist ex ante, because of an inability to ascertain a party‟s true 
characteristics prior to exchange (Reindfleisch & Heide; 1997). According to Akerlof (1970), 
„‟Information asymmetry develops when the seller has more information than the buyer‟‟. 
Author noted as well that this imbalance in the information makes it difficult for the buyer to 
observe the actions of the seller and consequently to know whether the seller is going to act 
truthfully in a transaction. 
The main purpose of monitoring is to reduce vulnerability of the form of information 
asymmetry (Wathne & Heide; 2000). Authors added that indirectly lower levels of 
information asymmetry may discourage opportunism in the first place, however monitoring 
may be ill suited to managing opportunism if the source of the vulnerability is not information 
related. 
Information asymmetry is a problem primarily for “experience” products (and services) that 
is, products whose quality is unobservable prior to purchase but is observable after purchase 
and use but not for “search” products, whose quality is observable prior to purchase (e.g., 
low-cost goods such as produce, poultry) (Mascharenhas, et al, 2008:70). Authors added that 
in tangible products, the problem of asymmetry occurs in relation to experience products 
whose quality is unobservable. 
 
Only when buyer, seller and arbiter all have identical information regarding the state of the 
world, and this information is adequate, can one say with confidence that the transaction will 
go through without difficulty (Williamson; 1975:31). 
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Sources of behavioral uncertainty mighty differ or vary with respect to the form of relations 
and the nature of partners themselves but Sollner (1999), argued that Opportunistic behavior 
and a governance mechanism can be sources with negative impact. Rindfleisch and Heide 
(2007) mentioned three sources which can be summarized in a following setting: 
 
TABLE 2: Sources of Behavioral uncertainty 
 Behavioral uncertainty 
A. Source of transaction costs 
 
Nature of Governance problem 
 
 
 
Performance Evaluation 
B. Type of transaction costs 
 
Direct costs 
           
 
Opportunity Costs 
 
 
 
Screening and selection costs (ex ante) 
Measurement costs (ex post) 
 
Failure to identify appropriate partners 
(ex ante) 
Productivity losses through effort 
adjustments (ex post). 
Source: (Adapted from Rindfleisch & Heide, 2007) 
 
Behavioral uncertainty is often related or is explained by concepts of difficulties in measuring 
performance (performance ambiguity) as well as information asymmetry. I will add an 
explanation of these concepts in explaining this phenomena. 
 
2.2.3 Environmental uncertainty: 
Noordewier (1990), coined the concept of environmental uncertainty as „‟unanticipated 
changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange‟‟. Also referring the same concept the 
authors added on the Williamson (1979) remarks that „‟high environmental uncertainty 
enforces the problems of writing a prior comprehensive contracts, which in turn create 
adaptation problem. 
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Bensaou (1999) coined this concept as external uncertainty and he defined it as unanticipated 
changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange relationship. The author continued to 
argue that the increase of uncertainty and unanticipated changes, the limited cognitive 
capabilities of human agents, limits their ability to spell out all possible contingencies 
beforehand or anticipate future events and plan for the unforeseeable.  
While Bensaou (1999) noted technological uncertainty as a key external uncertainty, Monalis, 
et al. (1997) noted market uncertainty and regulatory environmental uncertainty were key 
external environmental uncertainty, while shirking and motivation together with 
compensation uncertainty were forms of internal uncertainty. In his argument the author 
argued that market uncertainty drives companies to adapt constantly to changing demand and 
price conditions within markets and to facilitate information. The regulatory environment on 
the other hand is related to political constraints and it mostly makes it difficult to rely on 
independent agents abroad. The internal uncertainty is mostly important for firms that have 
subsidiaries or distributing agents. 
Rindfleisch and Heide (2007) mentioned three sources of environmental uncertainty which 
can be summarized in a following setting: 
 
TABLE 3: Sources of environmental uncertainty 
 Environmental uncertainty 
C. Source of transaction costs 
 
Nature of Governance problem 
 
 
 
Adaptation 
D. Type of transaction costs 
 
Direct costs 
           
 
Opportunity Costs 
 
 
 
Communication, negotiation, and 
coordination costs 
 
Mal-adaptations; Failure to adapt. 
Source: (Adapted from Rindfleisch & Heide, 2007) 
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Uncertainty poses a transactional problem of a somewhat different nature. For example in 
industrial purchasing context, one particular source of uncertainty is volume unpredictability 
(Heide et al, 1995:58) 
Environmental uncertainty creates an adaptation problem (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). In 
relation to transaction cost, authors argued that the associated transaction costs include the 
direct costs of communicating new information, renegotiating agreements, or coordinating 
activities to reflect new circumstances. As environmental uncertainty increases, different 
expectations and goals about future supply requirements develop (Artz & Brush 2000). 
 
Uncertainty characterizes a decision environment that is unpredictable for the decision maker 
(Sollner 1999). Author added that, under conditions of uncertainty, it will be impossible for 
the parties to a transaction to specify all contingencies in a contract.   
In its typical application, uncertainty refers to the degree to which unanticipated 
environmental changes alter the conditions underlying an exchange (Leiblein & Miller 
2003:844). Author added that uncertainty influences the cost of governance in a number of 
ways. To the extent that uncertainty hinders the coordination of linked activities, greater 
uncertainty may result in mal-adaptation costs ((Leiblein & Miller 2003:844). Uncertainty 
also inhibits a firm‟s ability to measure the contribution of any individual activity it increases 
the likelihood that shirking may occur undetected (Demsetz 1988) 
 
 
2.2.4 Frequency and duration 
Generally, according to Milgrom & Roberts (1992), when similar transactions occur 
frequently over a long period of time involving some of the same parties, the one who 
interacts repeatedly may find it valuable to design and introduce low-cost routines to manage 
the transaction. Frequency and duration also have another effect. Parties involved in along, 
close relationship with frequent interactions have many opportunities to grant or withhold 
favors to one another. The parties can sometimes eliminate the need for formal, detailed 
agreements, both because the parties understand what is expected of them and because they 
have no need to document those understandings for outsiders to enforce. The cost savings that 
result can be considerable. Frequency has been argued by Williamson (1979), to pull the 
relation from market into hierarchy.  
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2.3 FORMS OF GOVERNANCE 
Key forms of governance that have highly been discussed in relations to TCA are market, 
hierarchical governance and hybrid or relational governance. We also need to note vertical 
coordination is well embedded within the concept of hybrid or relational governance. Buvik 
and John (2000:52) noted a close relationship between hybrid and market but they noted two 
crucial differences first being the interaction pattern within hybrid modes extend well beyond 
contractually mandated action, and the second is that hybrid modes maintain these desired 
interaction patterns through private rather than legal ordering. Market governance mode 
involves less buyer-seller relations, and the earliest (and most common) applications of TCA 
focus on the vertical integration decision (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). Authors continued to 
argue that these studies typically focus on a manufacturing firms‟ decision to backward 
integrate into the supply of materials or components or forward integrate into distribution and 
sales. Heide & John (1992) noted that establishment of vertical control is viewed as a design 
of a specialized governance structure, which is required only under particular conditions such 
as presence of transaction-specific assets. The authors also pointed out clearly that the 
presence of specific assets only creates an incentive to establish vertical control, and does not 
in itself endow the firm with the ability to actually structure a relationship in the desired 
fashion. Heide and John (1992) also noted that when buyer transacts specific investments to 
the supplier, he/she literally transfer the control to the supplier and limits his ability to 
structure the relationship in accordance with the prescriptions from transaction cost theory. As 
a consequence, one party‟s ability to exercise decision control derives from the other party‟s 
decision to relinquish it (Heide & John 1992:35). Authors argument on the implication of this 
situation is that, control relinquishment may necessitate some form of protection against 
``reverse opportunism`` by the control holder.  
 
Vertical Coordination is viewed as a form of nonintegrated governance mode which involves 
a close coordination of two independent firms. Complementing on the foundation that was 
laid by Stern and Reve (1980), John and Reve (1982) and Reve and Stern (1986), Buvik and 
John (2002) defined vertical coordination as the purposive organization of activities and 
information flows between independent firms. Authors added that these activities‟ pattern and 
information flows possess two related features. First, they are not enforced through legal 
ordering. Second, profits from these patterns and flows are split up through ongoing 
adjustments and bargaining rather than contractually specified ex ante. With specific 
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reference to relevance of vertical coordination, Buvik and John (2002) pointed out that if 
vertical coordination is to be beneficial, they should observe that ex post transaction costs 
decline with greater vertical coordination, and vice versa.  
 
Hybrid governance modes fall into two general categories. One maintains a 
discrete separation between the exchange parties and enforces agreements 
through contractual authority. The other fosters closer ties between exchange 
partners and enforces agreements through appeals to common interests 
(Rindfleisch & Heide 1997:44). 
 
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993),  found that under conditions of high levels of specific 
investments, co-marketing alliance partners reduce power imbalances through formal 
contracts that build exit barriers, exclusive dealing, and financial incentives into the 
relationship. In contrast to the unilateral mechanisms, Rindefeisch & Heide (1997) argued that 
bilateral hybrid governance structures appear to provide a firm with a way to safeguard its 
specific assets by developing closer ties with its exchange partners. Although TCA scholars 
have traditionally focused on vertical relationships, a growing later after vertical integration 
between firms at the same point in the value chain (Rindfleisch& Heide 1997).  
 
 
2.3 HOW THE MAIN DIMENSIONS PREDICTS THE GOVERNANCE MODE. 
 
2.3.1 Hierarchical Governance versus Market governance 
On the study conducted by Geyskens et al (2006), following observations were made on 
regard to impact of dimensions on governance mode; 
Asset specificity, Volume uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty dimensions were observed 
to increases the likelihood of hierarchical governance over market governance. On the other 
side technical uncertainty increases the likelihood of choosing market governance over 
hierarchical governance. 
In most studies, asset specificity has been observed to have a positive relationship with 
vertical integration. According to Williamson (1985), environmental uncertainty will increase 
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more chances of a vertical integration as a governance form. Viewing the two sides of 
environmental uncertainty i.e. technological and volume uncertainty, Heide & John (1990) 
established that the increased level of technological uncertainty will foster a choice of 
marketing governance. On the other side, volume uncertainty increases more chances for 
having hierarchical over market governance. High degree of behavioral uncertainty has been 
observed to increase a high degree of vertical integration (hierarchy).  
 
2.3.2 Relational Governance (Hybrid) Versus Market Governance 
Based on the findings from study carried by Geyskens et al (2006), asset specificity increase 
the likelihood of choosing relational governance over market, but environmental uncertainty 
(volume and technical) increases the likelihood of choosing market governance over relational 
governance. 
With respect to the question of relational governance key additional aspects from Williamson 
(1996) and Geyskens et al (2005) should be taken into account. For instance Williamson 
(1996) observed that the relational governance in a less extent addresses uncertainty than 
market governance. On the other side the analytical results from a study conducted by 
Geyskens et al (2005), observed a positive impact of volume uncertainty on hierarchical 
governance (versus market governance), while there was no impact on relational governance 
(versus market governance). Technological uncertainty had no impact on either case from this 
study. Depending on the nature and/or the objective of study and setting of variables, the 
results highlighted above might change. When asset specificity is taken into account, the 
interaction effect with environmental uncertainty will likely tend to be positive. 
We also have to be aware of the fact that the relationship is also influenced by the way which 
other dimensions of TCA and governance relations in particularly are measured. Behavioral 
uncertainty has been observed to cause a positive effect on Hybrid governance in other study 
settings. 
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2.4 RELATIONS WITH  OTHER CONCEPTS 
Rokklan et al (2003) observed inherent dilemma on the impact of asset specificity on 
perceived opportunism.  On his findings he revealed that asset specificity has a potential for 
promoting or reducing opportunism.  Hawkin et al (2009) had same feelings when they made 
an observation that the safeguards that are put into place to reduce opportunism may 
sometimes produce unfavorable results. This means that asset specificity has close impact on 
perceived opportunism, but the direction of the impact might be positive or negative. Coase 
(1987) on the other hand confirmed the dilemma above by arguing impliedly that when asset 
becomes more specific, the possible gains from opportunistic behavior increase. Campell and 
Harris (1993) noted that contractual relations have a relation with cooperation.  As noted by 
Campbell and Harris (1993), the long-term relationship (co-operation) does not depend on the 
sanctions provided by the law nor on direct market pressures but rather on a package of 
incentives and disincentives established through a continuing co-operative relationship.  
With respect to TCA  in relation to other theories like RCT, Ivens  (2005), noted a negative 
impact of environmental uncertainty on contractual agreements.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING AND DEPENDECNE THEORY 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
TCA has not been the only theory dealing with transaction between and within firms. In 
business to business relations there are differences in power between firms, and also there are 
differences in type of relations (contractual or relational). To get a better account when it 
comes to business to business relations it is of importance to link these other theories so as to 
have a broad view of the analysis. 
 
Relational contracting theory 
RCT was developed by Macneil (1980), though it has been updated by several authors. It was 
integrated in TCA by Heide & John (1992), also Blois (2000), made an additional input in 
relation to norms. Macneil (1980) viewed contract as no more or less than relation among 
parties. Unlike TCA which deals with Transaction as units of analysis, RCT deals with 
relations as units of analysis. A close observation on this difference leads us to understand 
that when we deal with issues related to business to business relations, RCT is quickly 
implied in such a setting in addition to TCA. The cost of formulating complete contracts and 
the implied costs of enforcing such agreements persuades firms to form vertical or hybrid 
relations which on the other hand have a direct impact on aspects related to opportunism, 
vertical coordination, formal contractual agreements and related TCA concepts. In this study 
since the context is on business to business relation, it is of a great important to include RCT 
theory so as to have a better understandings on the observations that are to be analyzed by 
taking into account a broad view. 
 
Relational dependence theory 
According to Pfeffer (1982), since the organizations are not self-sufficient, their dependence 
or interdependence is the ultimate choice for their survival. The implication here is that the 
firm‟s behavior is externally influenced by those organizations who fulfill their demands.RDT 
premise lies on two sides of arguments, one being to respond to the demands of the 
organization which control critical resources, and the other being findings the means to reduce 
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the dependence by searching for autonomy or freedom from external environment. When 
studying TCA in business to business relations, it is important to include this theory because 
power differences or similarities and dependence or interdependence has implication when it 
comes to analyzing the relations between firms. For example issues related to opportunism, or 
vertical coordination in TCA can be influenced by other RDT theories and not necessarily the 
prediction elements from TCA dimensions. The argument for incorporating this concept on 
this study is trying to make sure that the findings presented or analyzed do not exist due to 
other issues related to firm resource dependencies among firms, and in some cases it will be 
rational to control for RDT dimensions for some of relations that have to be tested.  
 
 
3.1 RELATIONAL CONTRACTING THEORY: 
 
Contract implies an arrangement or agreement between two or more actors
1
. Macneil (1980) 
has tried to provide a well grounded perspective on this aspect of contract. On a more 
traditional definition Macneil (1980) defined contract as a promise or a set of promises for the 
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty. Every existence of ongoing contractual relations creates expectations 
that future exchange will occur and in partially predictable patterns, simply through the 
dynamics of the existing relations whether or not hierarchical (Macneil; 1980:8). 
Most inter-firm relationships between two independent actors are based on contracts, and the 
use of a hierarchical structure can only be used to a modest extent, since there is no common 
ownership or cross equity holdings (Buvik & Haugland 2005: 43). Williamson (1985) noted 
that parties to an asset-specific exchange have a mutual interest in perfecting the contracting 
relation. 
 
3.1.1 Classification of contracts 
Contracts can be viewed in terms of content where we specifically refer to complete versus 
incomplete contract, or can be viewed in terms of context where we refers to classical versus 
relationship contractual perspective. Which classification is important or is more relevant is 
not the basic question of concern because the two perspectives offer us a very well grounded 
base for understanding contracts. 
                                                          
1
 This definition was extracted from Notes given by Prof. Otto Andersen in strategic marketing, fall semester 
2008. 
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3.1.1.1 Complete versus Incomplete contracts 
Completeness of contract is more of an ideal situation because with completeness it implies 
that all the aspects of relations together with future contingencies and changes are all included 
in the contract. This is more said than done in practice because it is not possible to include all 
aspects that deal with a relation in a single contract.  
 
Incomplete contract is always a characteristic of real contracts. This is always so because in 
defining elements of the contracts the human nature is not always rational and apart from this, 
the foreseen contingencies are always not seen in the beginning of the contract. This leaves 
future expectations in defining the roles of contracts and it is where the element of game 
theory comes in to practice. Game theory predicts the choices of individual players in a given 
scenario to be of profit maximization. With this we can immediately predict that whenever 
there is expectation of future gains and dealings, parties will try to avoid unwanted behaviors, 
but whenever there are no future perceived gains of which is nature of discrete transactions, 
parties will end up maximize their own benefits. A contract is incomplete if and only if it does 
not incorporate some information about the state of nature that it would have been optimal for 
the contracting parties to include (Anderlini & Felli 2000). 
 
3.1.1.2 Classical contract perspective 
Classical contractual perspective tries to view contract as a more discrete oriented relations, 
where there are no relations built and mostly court is the mechanism for enforcement. Parties‟ 
identities are always not a key issue in this perspective because each transaction is treated as 
an independent one. Under discrete exchange the individual parties to a transaction remain 
autonomous, pursue their interests vigorously, and rely to a large extent on economic and 
legal sanctions for the purpose of enforcing contractual obligations (Heide 1994). 
The idea of a discrete transaction is the foundation on which concepts of relationship are built 
(Dwyer 1987). The archetype of discrete transactions is manifested by money on one side and 
an easily measured commodity on the other (Macneil 1980). 
Dwyer (1987:12) explicitly noted that ''The concept of discrete transaction specifically 
excludes relational elements. He continued to argue that discrete transaction is characterized 
by very limited communication and narrow content. Related to the aspect of parties in the 
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transaction he also commented that parties to transaction must be ignored or relations creep 
in.  
As noted by Goldberg (1976), discrete exchange is consistent with the underlying 
assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, in which individual transactions are assumed to 
be independent of past and future relations between the contracting parties and constitute 
nothing more than the transfer of ownership to a product or service. 
Discrete contract is one in which no relation exist between the parties apart from the simple 
exchange of goods (Macneil 1980: 10). 
Discrete transactions are non-primary relations. They involve only a small part of 
personality, are very limited in scope, are non-unique in personal terms, and hence 
can be transferred readily (Macneil 1980: 13). 
 
3.1.1.3 Relational contractual perspective 
This tries to view contract as not only discrete transactions, but also relationships exchange 
where parties have mutual benefits from one another and these relationships are self enforced. 
Any side in the relational contract perspective will try not to engage in the unwanted behavior 
because doing so; he will destroy his reputation in the relationship which is quite a huge blow 
especially when there are expectations of future dealings. 
 
Relational exchange transpires over time; each transaction must be viewed in terms of 
its history and its anticipated future. The basis for future collaboration may be 
supported by implicit and explicit as assumptions, trust, and planning (Dwyer; 1987). 
While Geyskens et al (2006) noted that relational governance modes incorporate a large 
informal component and are therefore not easily legally enforceable, Bradach & Eccles (1989) 
commented that no juridical mechanisms such as mutual dependence, trust, parallel 
expectations, joint action, and procedural fairness sustain these relational governance modes. 
 
3.1.2 Contractual Norms 
Key contractual norms identified by Macneil (1980), includes role integrity, mutuality, 
implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, flexibility, contractual solidarity, the 
linking norms:(restitution, reliance and expectation interests), creation and restraint of power 
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and harmonization with the social matrix. Of more emphasis in this study will be flexibility 
since it will be used to connect other transaction cost dimensions. 
 
The need for flexibility arises partly because of bounded rationality-the limits of a 
human mind to focus on available information-partly because of limited availability of 
information, and partly because the socioeconomic that any given contract has a 
capacity for change or that it breaks apart under pressures of change (Macneil 
1980:50). 
This term will synonymously be used as contractual flexibility. The limit of this term is in 
accordance with Macneil (1980) argument that „‟the norms of flexibility will govern 
everything outside the winds of change themselves being the ultimate in flexibility‟‟  
3.2 RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY: 
 
Resource dependence theory views inter-firm governance as a strategic response to conditions 
of uncertainty and dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Given the underlying assumption 
that few organizations are internally self-sufficient with respect to their critical resources, two 
potential problems are created. First, a lack of self-sufficiency creates potential dependence 
on the parties from whom the focal resources are obtained Emerson (1962).  
 
Social relations commonly entail ties of mutual dependence between the parties. A 
depends upon B if he aspires to goals or gratifications whose achievement is 
facilitated by appropriate actions on B's part (Emerson 1962: 32). 
 
Second, it introduced uncertainty into a firm decision making, to the extent that the resource 
flow are not subject to the firm‟s control, and may not be predicted accurately. 
 
If the dependence of one party provides the basis for the power of the other, that 
power must be defined as a potential influence: Power (Pab). The power of actor A 
over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially 
overcome by A (Emerson 1962:32)  
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Virtually organizational outcomes are based on interdependent causes or agents. 
Interdependence characterizes the relationship between the agents creating an outcome, not 
the outcome itself. A seller is interdependent with a buyer because the outcome of concluding 
a sale depends on the activities contributed by each. A seller is also interdependent with 
another seller if each is negotiating with the same buyer for a sale (Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978:40). 
 
3.2.1 Dependence and Transaction specific investment: 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), distinguished between two forms of Interdependence i.e. outcome 
interdependence and behavior interdependence. 
Interdependencies are not necessarily symmetric or balanced. They can be asymmetric 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978:41). Authors continued to argue that the interdependent existing 
between two social actors need not be either competitive or symbiotic-frequently, 
relationships contain both forms of interdependence simultaneously. Viewing aspect of the 
interdependence relevance authors added that interdependence is important to an organization 
because of the impact it has on the ability of the organization to achieve its desired outcome. 
 
Dependence involves circumstances where the buyer’s or supplier’s 
effectiveness is contingent on the performance of the other partner, and where 
few or no alternatives exist, placing the more needy party at the mercy of the 
less needy party (Hawkin et al  2009: 49). 
 
Dependence and power are conceptually inseparable (Gaski 1984; Hawkin et al 2009). 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) argued that there are three critical factors for determining the 
dependence of an organization on another. These factors are; the importance of resource (the 
extent to which the organization requires it for continued operation and survival), the extent to 
which the interest group has discretion over the resource allocation and use and the extent to 
which there are few alternatives, or the extent of control over the resource by the interest 
group. 
Heide and John (1988) noted that the dependency arising from specific asset is unique from 
other aspects of dependence. The author noted also that even on the case where a firm is 
dealing with one partner a high level of specific assets need to be present 
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3.2.2 Resource importance 
Certain types of resource are very critical for organization survival and operations. If such 
resources are in the hands of many or few suppliers, it has a very strong impact on the 
relations which the firm will have with these suppliers. 
An organization‟s vulnerability to extra organizational influence is partly determined by the 
extent to which the organization has come to depend on certain types of exchange for its 
operation (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978:46). Author as well added the dimensions of the 
importance of the resource exchange (are the relative magnitude of the exchange and the 
criticality of the resource), where he argued that the two are not independent. 
In measuring the relative magnitude of an exchange as a determinant of the importance of the 
resource, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978:46), put it in the following; 
 
‘The relative magnitude of an exchange as a determinant of the importance of the 
resource is measurable by assessing the proportion of total inputs or the proportion of 
total outputs accounted for by the exchange’ 
 
3.2.3 Discretion over Resource Allocation and Use. 
Pfeffer and Salanck (1978) argued that discretion is the capacity to determine the allocation or 
use of the resource. They continued to argue that such discretion is a major source of power 
and is more important when resource is scarcer. Commenting on the means and basis for 
control, they authors noted that basis for control of resource include; possession (example of 
this is knowledge, ownership rights), access to resource, actual use of resource and who 
controls its use and finally is ability to make rules, or otherwise regulate the possession, 
allocation, and use of resources and to enforce the regulations  
 
3.2.4 Concentration of Resource Control 
The dimension of concentration of resource control, implies that the control of resources that 
are important will not have the final say on creation of dependency to another organization. 
This means that concentration and control add another important ingredient on the former. 
 
That an interest group or organization controls a resource and that the resource is 
important, still does not assure that it will be able to create a dependency of another 
organization. The dependence of one organization on another also derives from the 
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concentration of resources control, or the extent to which input or output transactions 
are made by a relatively few or only one significant organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik; 
1978: 50) 
Arguing on the source of concentration, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) noted that concentration 
arise in multitude ways including organization having a monopoly position legally protected 
or legally established, collective organizations and associations also can lead into 
concentration 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS: 
 
4.0 Introduction: 
This study will draw the analysis from TCA together with relevant aspects from RCT and 
RDT. There will be three concepts to be tested in this study, and in each of the concept there 
will be a set of independent, moderating or controlling variables from these theories as it will 
be described in this section. The concepts intended to be examined are buyer perceived 
opportunism, vertical coordination and formal contractual agreement. 
 
Concept of buyer perceived opportunism 
Buyer and Supplier asset specificity will be used as independent variable in determining their 
impact on buyer perceived opportunism. Again in this model will be extended by observing 
the effect of behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity as moderating variable on the 
relationship between asset specificity (buyer and supplier asset specificity) and buyer 
perceived opportunism. In the analysis the effect of single moderating variables will be tested 
first, followed by their combining effect. 
 
Concept of Vertical coordination 
Contractual flexibility and vertical coordination will be tested for a relation, where contractual 
flexibility will be used as independent variable and vertical coordination being dependent 
variable. In this relationship, environmental uncertainty and asset specificity will also be used 
as independent variables.  
 
Concept of Formal contractual agreement 
The last set of relation to be tested in this study will be between environmental uncertainty 
and formal contractual agreement. In addition the controlling effect of buyer dependence and 
asset specificity will be introduced in this model.  
 
.  
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4.1 Constructed Relations 
 
Buyer specific asset specificity when employed will increase the buyer worries or perceived 
opportunism that the supplier might behave opportunistically. On the other side if supplier 
makes specific investment in the relationship, it will tend to reduce this perceived 
opportunism of the buyer (in case buyer has also made specific investment). Formally 
presented, I argue buyer asset specificity to increase buyer perceived opportunism, and for 
supplier asset specificity it is hypothesized to be opposite. On the other contractual flexibility 
is expected to increase the likelihood of vertical coordination while environmental uncertainty 
and asset specificity are expected to show a similar impact. With respect to formal contractual 
agreement, environmental uncertainty is expected to affect negatively the formal contractual 
agreement while asset specificity is expected to have a positive impact. Lastly the role of 
buyer dependence on formal contractual agreement is expected to be far more strongly 
negative on the sense that the positive effect of asset specificity will diminish.  
 
4.2 Effect on Buyer Perceived Opportunism 
 
 Direct effects of buyer asset specificity 
Investments in specific assets frequently occur in relationships between buyers and suppliers, 
and a key governance problem is to secure the return on such investments (Buvik & Haugland 
2005: 43).  
At the same time, specific investments involve considerable risk. The risk becomes apparent 
when the receiver of the investments in question is considered (Rokkan et al 2003:210). 
Findings that link asset specificity and opportunism have not always been consistency. For 
instance Rokkan et al (2003) noted that Specific investments pose an inherent dilemma 
because they have the potential to both promote and reduce opportunism on the receiver's 
part. Lui et al (2009), found a negative relationship between asset specificity and 
opportunism, taking case from China, but his findings was supported by Rokkan et al (2003) 
statement that since specific investments involve dedicated (rather than general purpose) 
assets, they also have the potential to create considerable value for the receiver and thus may 
actually discourage opportunism.  
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On the other hand Anderson (1987) found a positive impact of asset specificity on 
opportunism. These effects of asset specificity on opportunism fall under the category of 
passive or active in situations that might be existing or new as classified by Wathne & Heide 
(2000). Perceived opportunism is outside this box of this classification because it is more of 
assumed situation or anticipation and with respect to this perspective the findings suggested 
above are likely going to differ since the concepts predicted are different.  
 
When buyer invest specific asset in a relationship with supplier or distributor, he will likely 
perceive opportunism risk from his partner. Any relationship, regardless of its overall 
description, may offer temptations for opportunism, such as when one party makes specific 
investment (Rokkan eta al, 2003:211). Authors as well recognized that opportunism may be 
influenced by some mental aggregation on a firm‟s part about the parties‟ relative exposure 
rather than by what each party has at stake individually. 
 
With respect to findings related to perceived opportunism, Rokkan et al (2003), found a 
significant positive effect of buyer asset specificity on opportunism. The implication of this 
finding is that the level of buyer perceived opportunism will likely increase when he put 
specific investment in the relationship. This observation is more enlightening because the 
study (from Rokkan et al, 2003) divided buyer opportunism as well as supplier opportunism 
and each responded on how they perceived opportunism from their partner with respect to 
specific investments they committed in the relationship.  
 
From this observation I do propose a positive relationship between buyer asset specificity and 
buyer perceived opportunism, meaning the increased buyer asset specificity will likely give 
rise to more buyer perceived opportunism from his partner (supplier or distributor). 
  
 
H1a: Buyer asset specificity increases buyer perceived opportunism. 
 
Direct effect of supplier asset specificity 
 
The argument raised on opportunism with respect to asset specificity do not differ with regard to sides 
which invest, but the differences regarding sides will occur when we start to consider the question 
about whom perceived opportunism are we discussing. Buyer or supplier will likely perceive an 
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inherent risk of opportunism when he commits specific assets, but if it is his partner who invests then 
he will not have to worry. If it is only supplier who invest specific asset and buyer does not, then the 
role then the effect of such investment will not have any significance with respect to buyer perceived 
opportunism. This is because of fact that the opportunism problem is associated with asset specificity 
and if the buyer has not invested such assets, he will not likely feel this problem.  
Asset has been associated with opportunism in different studies. Coase (1987) argued that as assets 
become more specific and more appropriate quasi rents are created and therefore the possible 
gains from opportunistic behavior increases. 
Asset specificity raises the prospect for opportunism (Demsetz 1991). Author added that this 
heightened prospect is presumed to raise the cost of transacting.  
 
Study from Rokkan et al, (2003), did not found a significant impact of supplier asset 
specificity on buyer perceived opportunism towards supplier. On these grounds I do argue 
that when supplier invest specific investment in the relationship with the buyer, in a situation 
where buyer also has committed specific investment, the level of buyer perceived 
opportunism towards supplier will likely be reduced. Again when buyer has not committed 
specific investment in the relationship with supplier, there will be no significant relationship 
between supplier asset specificity and buyer perceived opportunism. 
 
H1b: Supplier asset specificity reduces buyer perceived opportunism. 
 
 
Moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty 
 
With respect to Wathne and Heide (2000) on classification of opportunism, aspects such as 
shirking for example, are more linked to behavioral uncertainty problem. In the study by 
Rokkan et al (2003), authors acknowledge such aspects (behavioral uncertainty) should be 
included in further studies with respect to opportunism (their study was limited by not 
including this variable). On the other hand Enderson (1988), found a positive association 
between performance evaluation problem and opportunism. Performance evaluation problem 
is a term that is mostly considered to be defined within a concept of behavioral uncertainty.  
 
Transaction cost analysis views behavioral uncertainty as arising from the difficulties 
associated with monitoring the contractual performance of exchange partners (Williamson 
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1985). Rindefleisch and Heide (1997) as well noted that most of the studies in their review 
conceptualize behavioral uncertainty as the degree of difficulty associated with assessing the 
performance of transaction partner. Due to close definition of performance ambiguity within a 
concept of behavioral uncertainty, it is logical that if performance ambiguity has been found 
to have a positive relationship with opportunism, then it is anticipated that behavioral 
uncertainty will do the same, in case we separate the two terms. Since opportunism problem is 
arises as a result of commitment of specific assets, I do argue the existence of behavioral 
uncertainty will have a mediating effect on this relationship.  
 
Basic assumption of trying to test the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty in this 
relationship is due to the fact that perceived opportunism is highly associated with human 
element toward the relationship. Due to this assumption, behavioral uncertainty might as well 
impact the way which buyer perceives when it comes to specific asset commitment.  
The main difference between behavioral assumptions and other relationships and constructs 
embedded in the structure and mechanism of a theory is that the former are more closely 
associated with human attitudes, beliefs and perception (Tsang, 2006) 
 
H2a: Behavioral uncertainty and has a moderating effect on relationship between asset 
specificity (supplier and buyer asset specificity) and buyer perceived opportunism 
 
Moderating effect of performance ambiguity: 
The argument for including performance ambiguity does not differ much in terms of 
reasoning raised on above section regarding behavioral uncertainty, but the only different 
assumption here is derived from the fundamental causes for performance ambiguity. Stump & 
Heide (1996) noted that evaluation difficulty may be due to the efforts required or to a general 
lack of performance standards. In some context behavioral uncertainty is assumed to cause 
evaluation problem. This was noted by Rindfleisch & Heide (1997:46) when the authors 
pointed out that „Transaction cost analysis claims that high levels of behavioral uncertainty 
increase the costs of evaluating the performance of exchange partner‟. 
 
The focus of this study is not to find out whether there are some differences in these concepts 
(behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity), but TCA literature has signalized the 
existence of some of the perspectives which may give rise to some fundamental causes of the 
two concepts. Based on the recommendations from Rokkan et al (2003) (on including 
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behavioral uncertainty aspect on relation between asset specificity and opportunism), a close 
association between performance ambiguity and behavioral uncertainty (Heide 1996, Stump 
& Heide 1997) as well as the positive association between performance ambiguity and 
opportunism (Anderson 1987; Oachi 1979) this study  do suggest as well that performance 
ambiguity will have a mediating effect on the relationship between asset specificity and buyer 
perceived opportunism.   
 
 
H2b: Performance ambiguity has a moderating effect on relationship between asset 
specificity (supplier and buyer asset specificity) and buyer perceived opportunism. 
 
4.3. Effects on Vertical Coordination 
 
Direct effect of contractual flexibility 
Flexibility defines a bilateral expectation of willingness to make adaptations as circumstances 
change (Heide & John 1992:35). Authors continued to argue that from supplier‟s perspective, 
it represents insurance that the relationship will be subject to good-faith modification if a 
particular practice proves detrimental in the light of changed circumstances. 
It is not the degree to which agreements have been tightly worded ex ante that is of concern 
rather, it is the reaction toward change requests that matters (Noordewier et al 1990: 83). Also 
authors noted that as buyers and suppliers move from discrete continuum (where terms are 
more binding) they are expected to be more flexible as terms changes. 
 
Flexibility is a sign of trust and confidence among trading partners, and basic assumption is 
that this might be an opening door towards vertical coordination. The other side of argument 
is that, flexibility is important ingredient for cooperation and when it exists for sometimes it 
will transform the relationship between supplier and buyer in a very positive level. This 
assumption will lead to the hypothesis that contractual flexibility will have a significant 
positive impact on vertical coordination.  
 
H3: Contractual flexibility has a positive impact on vertical coordination 
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Other effects (Asset specificity and Environmental uncertainty) 
Asset specificity and environmental uncertainty has been proposed to have impact on vertical 
coordination. Buvik & Grøhhaug (2000), found a positive impact of both asset specificity and 
environmental uncertainty, but the interaction between the two terms were having a negative 
impact. On the other hand Frank and Henderson (1992) found similar results, but with respect 
to asset specificity they found R&D to have a positive impact while other form of asset 
specificity showed negative impact. I anticipate a positive impact of environmental 
uncertainty in vertical coordination but my assumption is that, in a situation dominated with 
contractual flexibility the effect of environmental uncertainty might be minimal. With respect 
to asset specificity I will have to take a note raised by Buvik and John (200) when they 
pointed out that vertical coordination assists buyer-seller ties to adapt better but 
simultaneously increases the hazard posed to the supplier‟s exposed specific investment. With 
this statement I anticipate a negative effect of asset specificity on vertical coordination is 
likely as well [this is supported by Frank and Henderson (1992)].  
 
4.4 Effects on Formal Contractual Agreements 
Direct effect of environmental uncertainty: 
Environmental uncertainty assesses aspects of market turbulence and vendor-related 
uncertainties. Price and volume uncertainties are key aspects of this construct's domain. 
Spekman and Stern (1979) noted that environmental uncertainty can also be categorized in 
terms of external uncertainty (government regulations, economic conditions, and other related 
technological and volume changes) and Internal uncertainty (material tolerances, production 
estimates, sales forecasts and so on). Williamson (1985) indicated that the increased level of 
environmental uncertainty will give high chances for hierarchical governance form. With the 
same respect it is expected if the situation is an ongoing relationship, the increased 
environmental uncertainty will lead to more coordination.  
 
On the other hand, if we view environmental uncertainty in its two components i.e. volume 
and technological uncertainty we can have different implications on these components. Heide 
& John (1990) established that the increased level of technological uncertainty will foster a 
choice of marketing governance so as to avoid be locked up in the technology that can will be 
old in a short time. This is consistent with empirical finding of Geyskens et al (2005). 
Anderson (1985) noted that some measures for environmental uncertainty reflect instability 
(complex, volatile, difficult to monitor, uncertain markets, high forecast error). Other items 
41 
 
reflect venturing into the unknown as the firms emphasis on new activities (new product sales, 
new markets). 
In a study by Andersen & Buvik (2002) authors noted that the changes in market condition 
and technology represent a significant source of environmental uncertainty. In their study they 
used formative model to define the constructs. 
In the same line of argument, the study makes an assumption that, when there is 
environmental uncertainty, it will demand frequent changes of fixed contracts a task which 
will be very demanding and sometimes not easy to comprehend when the turbulence is too 
huge and too frequent. Ivens (2005) agreed on the problematic impact of environmental 
uncertainty in establishing agreements. This implies that environmental uncertainty will have 
a negative impact on formal contractual agreements. 
 
The other side of the observation which this study will take is on the assessment of the 
environmental uncertainty relation with performance ambiguity. The line of thought is that the 
increased level of environmental uncertainty will likely increase level of performance 
evaluation problem.  
To the extent that uncertainty hinders the coordination of linked activities, greater uncertainty 
may result in mal-adaptation costs ((Leiblein & Miller, 2003:844). This observation was as 
well supported by Manolis et al (1997). 
 
H4: Environmental uncertainty has a negative impact on formal contractual   
agreement. 
 
 
Controlling the effect of specific investment 
Buyer specific investment in the relationship with supplier will likely be associated with 
safeguarding through establishment of formal contractual agreement because of anticipation 
opportunism problem. Buvik & Reve (2002) found a positive association of specific 
investment on formal contractual agreement, but such an effect is contingent on buyer 
dependence. This means a weak power of buyer in the relationship will put him in 
disadvantaged position of negotiating contracts. 
  
H5: Commitment of specific asset specificity by the buyer will have a positive impact 
on formal contractual agreement. 
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Controlling effect of buyer dependence.  
Power may be conceptualized as a serious threat of one-sided opportunistic action, rendering 
the less powerful party more dependent on the other (Hawkin et al 2009). If the investor firm 
commits fewer resources to the trading partner, the investor firm assumes less risk of investee 
opportunism (Hawkin et al 2009). 
With respect to unilateral dependency, Heide (1994) proposed that the unilateral dependency 
has a negative impact on bilateral governance in the form of flexible adjustment process. 
Bilateral dependency condition develops when one or both parties specializes their assets in 
support of exchange (Williamson 1986). Author added that such parties want to safeguard the 
relation against premature termination. Symmetric dependence is another term that refers to 
this concept. 
 
In the absence of symmetric dependence an individual party will have little or no 
incentive to show flexibility, because no guarantee exists that such action will be 
reciprocated. In fact, short-term disturbances might represent an opportunity for 
individual parties to pursue opportunistically short-term advantages (Heide, 1994: 79) 
 
Macneil (1978) noted that the existence of symmetric dependence serves to align the 
respective parties‟ interests and promotes flexibility as a means of preserving the relationship.  
When buyer is dependent in the relationship, he will have less power to enforce the 
agreements or negotiation with the supplier and this will negatively affect formal contractual 
agreements. These findings are also supported by Buvik and Reve (2002) where they 
confirmed a strong negative effect of buyer dependence on formulation of contractual 
agreement when buyer has committed specific investments in the relation 
 
H6: Buyer dependence have a strong negative effect on formal contractual agreement 
than asset specificity 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES 
 
5.0 Study design and Sample Selection 
The study was done by doing a survey of firms in Tanzania focusing on business to business 
producer to distributor relations. The distribution firm was a buying firm and the producing 
firm was supplying firm in this study setting.  The distributing (buying firms) were the ones 
which were contacted for facilitation of this study. The buying firms that were used included 
small, medium and large enterprises so as to obtain enough response. The buying firm was 
asked to identify a very strong relation with a supplying firm. The character of relation has to 
reflect a high frequency, long term relations and even importance of the relation to buying 
firm in term of the quantity which is purchased by the buying firm from this supplier. The 
buying firm was then asked to use only this one relationship in answering the questionnaire. 
Since the instructions for filling out this questionnaire was quite necessary to be captured by 
respondents before filling it out, I found necessary to have personal contact with the 
respondents. The sample frame for this study was based on Tanzania revenue authority 
records for registered business of 2008.  
Through personal contact with heads of Small and Medium business divisions in the country, 
I was able win their minds, and they were also willing to participate in this study as they 
found it worth going for.  
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Sample characteristics 
25.8% of firms involved from the study were established between1990-2000, 73.2% were 
from established after year 2000, and the rest were established before 1990. There are many 
firms that were established in Tanzania after 1995 due to major economic reforms that aimed 
at improving local business participation by enhancing emergence of many SMEs. With 
respect to business turnover 30.9% of firms had an annual turnover of up to Tshs 5 million, 
55.7% with annual turnover of between 5 to 200 million (exclusive), 12.4 had annual turnover 
of between 200 to 800 million (exclusive), and the rest with above 800 million. The number 
of employee these firms involved in the study was also relevant. 47.4% of the firms 
participated in this study had less than 5 employee, 27.8 with 5-10 employee, 11.3% had 10-
15 employees, 8.2% the rest had more than 20 employees (5.2%).  Data between the ranges 
are exclusive. With regard to amount purchased per annual, 25.8% of firms purchased from 
their supplier an amount of less than 10% of their total purchases, 33% with between 10-40 
exclusively, 23.7% with between 40-70% exclusively and the rest were above 70%  
5.1 Data collection 
The major form of data collection was through a questionnaire. Due to the fact that the 
understanding of what I wanted the respondent to know before filling out the questionnaire, I 
decided to carry personal contact with respondents before delivering questionnaire to them. 
Once I made appointment with a respondent, which in most cases through phone call, I visited 
the respondent and explain to them which relation he should choose and use it in answering 
the questionnaire. The purpose was to avoid different respondents answering different things, 
which will confuse the study objective. The questionnaires were self administered. Due to 
little time constraint I had to deliver the questionnaire in person, and obtain appointment from 
the respondent on a time that I will pick it up. This method was very effective in obtaining 
respondents commitment to the study. About 150 firms were identified to participate in this 
study. Out of them, 130 firms were interested to take part in the study. 130 questionnaires 
were then distributed to these firms which agreed to participate in the study. From 130 
questionnaires distributed 87 of them were collected on the first phase, followed by 10 
questionnaires on the last phase after one reminder and follow up. The remaining 33 
questionnaires were never returned. The difference between the first and second phase was 
not significant because the size of late phase was very minimal to cause any difference in the 
observation. 
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5.2 The Estimated Model 
Linear regressive (additive and moderation) models were used to cover the conceptual 
framework and hypothesis established in this study. H1a and H1b were tested using equation 
1, while H2a and H2b were tested using equation 2 and 3. On the other hand H3 was tested 
using equation 4, while equation 5 was used to test H4, H5 and H6.   
 
Bopport = β0 + β1BUASP + β2SUASP + ε                                 (i) 
Where, 
Bopport = Buyer perceived opportunism 
BUASP = Buyer asset specificity 
SUASP = Supplier asset specificity 
 
Bopport = β0 + β1 BUASP + β2 SUASP + β3BU + β4BUASPXBU + β5SUASPXBU + ε     (ii) 
Where, 
BU = Behavioral uncertainty 
PA = Performance ambiguity 
BUASPXBU = Interaction of buyer asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty 
SUASPXBU = Interaction of supplier asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty 
 
 
 
Bopport = β0 + β1 BUASP+ β2 SUASP+ β3PA + β4BUASPXPA + β5SUASPXPA + ε         (iii) 
Where, 
PA = Performance ambiguity 
BUASPXPA = Interaction of buyer asset specificity and performance ambiguity 
SUASPXPA = Interaction of supplier asset specificity and performance ambiguity 
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This study supplemented other forms of relations as well covering aspects of contractual 
flexibility, vertical coordination, formal contractual agreement and environmental uncertainty. 
The models presented are additive and were used to test H3 up to H5 
 
Vertcoord = β0+ β1CFlex + β2BUASP + β3SUASP + β4ENVU + ε               (iv) 
  
Where, 
Vertcoord = Vertical Coordination                          
 
 
FCA = β0+ β1ENVU+ β2BUASP + β3SUASP+ β4BUDEP +  ε    (v) 
Where,  
FCA = Formal contractual agreement 
ENVU = Environmental uncertainty         
 
Some of the models indicated above included controlling variables in their analysis. At each 
moment when controlling variables will be used in analysis, it will be clearly indicated.  
5.3 Measurement of Variables used 
5.3.1 Asset specificity 
Stump and Heide (1996) used five item, seven-point scale, anchored by "strongly disagree" 
and" strongly agree" statements in measuring buyer‟s specific investment. Using Anderson 
(1985) measurement on asset specificity, he had 7 elements that he used in evaluating this 
concept, but I have to note that this was within the context of sales people and their employer. 
When the relationship moves from one setting to the other some elements we use to measure 
the specificity might vary but the context remains the same. 
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Examples of statements for assessing asset specificity by the buyer included, 
Our production system that incorporates this item has been tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with this supplier; 
We have spent significant resources to ensure that our specifications for this item fit 
well with this supplier's production capabilities;  
Gearing up to deal with this supplier on this item required highly specialized tools and 
equipment on our part;  
The procedures and routines we have developed to obtain this item are tailored 
 
On the other side, the author measured supplier asset specificity as well using same scale and 
format but he changed some of statements. The example is as follows (Stumph & Heide 
1996). 
This supplier has spent significant resources to ensure the specifications for this item 
fit well with our firm's production capabilities;  
This supplier's production system has been tailored to producing the items being sold 
to our firm;  
Gearing up to deal with our firm on this item requires highly specialized tools and 
equipment on the part of this supplier;  
The procedures and routines this supplier has developed for this item are tailored to 
the particular situation of our firm;  
Our firm has some unusual technological norms and standards for this item, which 
have required extensive adaptations by this supplier;  
Most of the training this supplier has undertaken relative to our firm's requirements 
for this item cannot be easily adapted for use with another customer.  
 
When measuring asset specificity most researchers use what is called multi-item scales, 
normally of the Likert type. Multi-item scales contain several measures (operationalizations) 
in order to capture most of the concept that the researcher wishes to measure. Items are 
developed to capture both material and immaterial aspects of asset specificity. See, for 
instance, the example of measuring asset specificity by Buvik and John (1999).  
Rokklan et al (2003) on their study on specific investments in marketing relations, they used 
7-points likert scale of ``completely inaccurate description``/completely accurate description. 
Following are examples of items they used 
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We have made significant investments in equipment dedicated to our relationship with 
this supplier;  
We have made extensive internal adjustments in order to deal effectively with this 
supplier;  
Training our people to deal with this supplier has involved substantial commitments of 
time and money;  
Our logistics systems have been tailored to meet the requirements of dealing with this 
supplier. 
 
On the other had in measuring supplier-specific investments the authors used same scale and 
context but the items somehow changed. Example of items used in measuring supplier-
specific investments included training, production system and logistic system tailored to meet 
the requirement of buying company. The above measures were also supported by the study 
carried by Heide and John (1992). This study used these items but again some minor 
adjustments were carried to ensure they fit with the study context. 
Buvik and Reve (2002), used five items (α =0.79) in measuring supplier specific investment, 
while using six items (α =0.77) in measuring buyer specific investment, also same in Buvik 
(2000) study. In this study buyer asset specificity was measured using four items, which all of 
them loaded into one component using principal component factor analysis method. The 
reliability of this component measured α = 93.35% which is very significant. KMO was .796 
also indicates a satisfactory correlation level of the items which justified for factor analysis. 
Again Bartlett‟s test indicated λ2= 501.174 which was significant at p < .01, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the correlation matrix was identity matrix.  The buyer asset specificity was 
abbreviated by term BUASP in the analysis. 
  
On the same grounds, Supplier asset specificity was measured using 4 items. By using factor 
analysis method the results from varimax rotation indicated that two of the items loaded in 
single component. The reliability coefficient for the variables in the component measured α = 
95.91%, which was quite significant. Other measures were used for factor analysis 
justification like KMO, which measured at .813, indicating correlation among items were 
significant. Bartlett‟s test as well measured at λ2= 573.517 which was significant at p < .01, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix was identity matrix.  Supplier asset 
specificity was abbreviated by term SUASP in the analysis.  
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5.3.2 Buyer Perceived opportunism  
On the study carried by Rokkan et al (2003) on Opportunism they used seven-point likert-type 
scale having ``completely inaccurate description``, ``completely accurate description``. 
Following are examples of the items they used. 
On occasion, this supplier lies about certain things in order to protect their interests; 
This supplier sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later;  
This supplier does not always act in accordance with our contract(s);  
This supplier sometimes tries to breach informal agreements between our companies 
to maximize their own benefits;  
This supplier sometimes uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm. 
 
This study in particular used 5 items above to measure this concept. By using factor loading, 
all components loaded into a single component. Further the reliability analysis measured a 
level of α = 70.89% which is quite significant. KMO and Bartlett‟s test measured at .850 and 
1106.298 (significant at p< .01) respectively, implying a significant level of correlation 
among the items, leading to rejection of null hypothesis that the correlation matrix was 
identity as well as justifying the factor analysis attempt. In the analysis this concept will be 
abbreviated by term Bopport 
 
5.3.3 Contractual Flexibility 
Flexible adjustment processes, was measured by a set of items describing the parties' expected 
flexibility in response to changing circumstances (Heide 1994). Measuring the flexibility 
Heide and John (1992) and Heide (1994) used 7-point likert scale consisting of three items of 
Completely inaccurate description/completely accurate description. Examples of items used 
on this study included the following; 
 
Flexibility in response to request for changes is a characteristic of this relationship; 
The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope 
with changing circumstances;  
When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a new deal 
than hold each other to the original terms. 
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This study in trying to measure this concept it used all the three items and all loaded in a 
single component. The reliability analysis measured a level of α = 78.92% which was 
significant. KMO and Bartlett‟s test indicated a measure of .623 and λ2 = 98.234 (significant 
at p < .01) respectively. The findings from these two measured indicate a significant 
correlation between the variables that supported as well the factor analysis method. In the 
analysis this term was abbreviated by CFLEX 
 
5.3.4 Supplier and Buyer dependence 
Heide (1994), agreeing with the measures developed by Kaufmann and Stern (1988), used 
four items in measuring both buyer and supplier dependence. These items were supplemented 
using 7-point likert scale ranking the statements of completely accurate 
description/completely inaccurate description. 
Elements that were used in measuring buyer dependence included: 
If we decided to stop purchasing from this supplier, we could easily replace their 
volume with purchases from other suppliers;  
There are many competitive suppliers of these components;  
Our production system can easily adapted to using components from a new supplier; 
Dealing with a new supplier would only require a limited redesign and development 
effort on our part. 
 
Items for Supplier dependence measurement included: 
If we stopped buying from this supplier, they could easily replace our volume with 
sales to some other buyer;  
It would be relatively easy for this supplier to find another buyer for these 
components;  
Finding new buyers for these components would not have a negative impact on the 
price this supplier can charge; 
 If the relationship with our company was terminated, it would not hurt this supplier’s 
operations. 
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One means to validate the reciprocal nature of TCE theory as it relates to dependence is to 
measure opportunism at both sides of the dyad (Hawkin et al 2009: 67) 
Buvik & Reve (2002) in measuring supplier dependence they used two item (α =0.67. Items 
used included; should the sales to our company cease, it would be very difficult for this 
supplier to find an alternative purchasers; should the sales to our company cease, our supplier 
would face severe economic problem. 
Also in measuring buyer dependence Buvik and Reve (2002) used two items (α =0.77) in 
measuring this concept. The items they used included; should our supplier terminate its 
activities, it would be very difficult for our firm to find substitute suppliers; our firm has 
access to several suppliers which can easily replace this supplier. The potential for 
opportunism will represent a disincentive for the dependent party to show forbearance or 
flexibility in the first place (Heide 1994). Rokklan et al (2003) used dollar size on sales 
between supplier and buyer to measure relative size between the firms. Again it is the 
intention of this study to build upon these instruments so as to facilitate the empirical 
consistence.  
 
For this study in particular the buyer dependence was measured using four items. Using factor 
loading analysis the four items loaded in 1 component. Further reliability analysis indicated α 
=96.98% which is quite significant. KMO and Bartlett‟s test measure at a level of .854 and λ2 
= 507.724 (significant at p < .01) respectively, supporting the idea of high correlation among 
variables and the necessity for proceeding to factor analysis. The concept of buyer 
dependence is abbreviated by BUDEP in the analysis.  
 
On the other hand supplier dependence was measured by four items. By factor loading 
analysis, the result from viramax rotation showed that all the items loaded highly into one 
component. Further reliability analysis indicated α = 95.53%. KMO and Bartlett‟s test also 
supported these findings by measuring .854 and λ2 = 507.724 (significant at p < .01) 
respectively. The concept was abbreviated by the term SUPDEP. 
 
5.3.5 Formal contractual agreements. 
Buvik & Reve (2002), used five items (α =0.73) in measuring the formal contract with seven 
likert scale of completely disagree/completely agree. 
Items used were as follows; 
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Written contracts regulate our firm’s rights to insight and documentation of 
production costs at this supplier;  
Firm agreements stipulate all aspects concerning the exchange of information about 
prices and market condition between our firms;  
Written contracts stipulate all aspects regarding parties’ tasks and influence in quality 
assurance;  
Firm contract stipulates all aspects regarding the tasks and influence of two parties in 
the quality control of the products we purchase from this supplier;  
Written contracts stipulate all aspects regarding the selection of sub-suppliers for the 
products we order from this supplier. 
 
This study after carried several adjustment using factor loading analysis due to cross relation 
of items between components, the final result was to use three items in measuring this 
concept. All three items by using factor loading analysis measured component 1. Reliability 
analysis indicated a measure of α = 81.5% which is quite above the cutting point. This was 
well confirmed by KMO and Bartlett‟s test which measured at .648 and λ2= 117.283 
(significant at p < .01) respectively,  implying a very high correlation among the measure 
items. 
 
5.3.6 Behavioral Uncertainty:   
This dimension was also measured using 7 points likert scale by identify different elements 
related to difficulties in measuring performance, for example one element was ''we are cannot 
able to estimate effectiveness of the partner in relationship''. These and other elements were 
ranked using this scale and 1 indicated lowest level of difficult in measuring performance 
where 7 will indicate highest level. Also to be sure that the elements are measuring the same 
dimension, the factor loading aspect was used in this respect. 
Most studies conceptualize behavioral uncertainty as the degree of difficulty associated with 
assessing the performance of transaction partner (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). Multi-item 
scales, has also been used in measuring this concept. Mainly the emphasis has been on how 
hard or difficult is it in terms of evaluating performance of the partner in relationship. In some 
relationship quality or efficiency may be the main thing they want the partner to do, and on 
this respect measurement of behavioral uncertainty will require items that are related to 
quality and efficiency as well. The study by Buvik and Andersen (2002) for example 
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international versus domestic setting impliedly used dummy variables where 1 indicates 
international relation and there is expectation of behavioral uncertainty, and 0 indicates none 
i.e domestic.    
 
Again most instruments developed to measure behavioral uncertainty were related to 
employee-employer relations especially sales force as the agent. Example of these studies 
includes Anderson and Scmittlein (1984) who observed integration of sales force (empirical 
examination), Javorski & Macinnis (1989), who worked on marketing jobs and Management 
control as well as Ramaswami et al (1997) information asymmetry between salesperson and 
supervisor. Though items that were used might not make sense when duplicated to other 
forms of studies like buyer-supplier relations, their contextual meaning still make sense. 
However, I will borrow some elements that were highlighted in a discussion paper developed 
by Andersen and Buvik (2001) on Methodological discussion. 
Items for measuring behavioral uncertainty included. 
We are uncertain about how our supplier organizes purchases used for input;  
Our knowledge about our supplier’s production process is limited;  
We have little knowledge about the terms of trade she/he offers to other buyers; 
 It is difficult to interpret how the supplier perceives the present relationship with our 
firm;  
We are uncertain about our supplier’s future plans for our relationship. 
 
This study used all the five items in measuring this concept. By factor loading analysis all 
items loaded into one component. Further the reliability analysis measured α = 77.61%. KMO 
and Bartlett‟s test measured at .764 and λ2 = 134.549 (significant at p < .01) respectively, 
implying the justification for factor analysis and support for the idea that the items are 
significantly correlated in measuring this concept. This concept was abbreviated by term BU. 
 
5.3.7 Performance ambiguity 
Stump and Heide (1996) used four-item, seven-point scale, anchored by "strongly disagree" 
and"strongly agree" statements in measuring the performance ambiguity. 
Example of statements used included; 
Items were precise standards by which to assess this supplier's performance is not readily 
available;  
Evaluating this supplier's performance is a highly subjective process;  
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This supplier is performing so many different tasks that it is difficult to ascertain whether a 
good job is being done; 
 It is difficult to determine whether agreed upon quality standards and specifications are 
adhered to. 
 
Anderson (1985), in measuring performance ambiguity he included items that measures 
behavioral uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. 
The performance ambiguity scale describes the inherent difficulty faced by the buyer 
in accurately evaluating the supplier's performance. Evaluation difficulty may be due 
to the efforts required or to a general lack of performance standards (Stump & Heide 
1996). 
 
Again it is important to note that concept of performance ambiguity has been used to imply 
uncertainty and this raise the question whether behavioral uncertainty or environmental 
uncertainty can replace this term. Anderson (1985) when made the study on sales people as 
outside agents he coined this scenario as follows ``Uncertainty exists for the manager of a`` 
sales force when performance is ambiguous. Gosh & John (2005) in measuring performance 
ambiguity used 6 items and were ranked by 7-point likert scale of 1-strong disagree to 7-
strongly agree. Examples of elements that were used included: 
It is inadequate to evaluate this supplier based on items(s) price; Evaluating the 
supplier’s performance is a highly complex process; It is difficult to verify whether 
this supplier is performing all of its contractual obligations under this agreement; 
There would be significant costs associated with one-site monitoring of the supplier; 
Precise standards to assess this supplier’s performance is not readily available. 
 
This study used four items in measuring this concept and all loaded into one component with 
reliability coefficient α = 70%. On the other side KMO and Bartlett‟s test measured at .771 
and λ2 = 65.647 (significant at p < .01) respectively implying a very significant correlation of 
these terms in measuring the concept. This concept of performance ambiguity was 
abbreviated by term PA in the analysis. 
 
5.3.8 Environmental uncertainty: 
Multi items scales has mostly being used in many studies for this variable. The elements used 
for explaining instabilities of environment are the risks in adding or investing in markets. 
Other studies broadened the environmental uncertainty into technological and volume 
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uncertainty where the former relates to limited ability in predicting technical aspects of 
relationship while later refers to limitations in predicting the volume aspects of relationship 
(this is mostly fluctuation that cannot be foreseeing). Other studies as well included the 
element of unpredictability and changeability o the environment.  
This measure comprises five items consisting of 5-point strongly agree/strongly disagree 
scales in some studies. The mean of the five items was used as the measure of uncertainty 
(Noordiwier et al 1990). Anderson (1985) on items measuring environmental uncertainty 
noted that some items reflect instability (complex, volatile, difficult to monitor, uncertain 
markets, high forecast error) and other items reflect venturing into the unknown as the firm‟s 
emphasis on new activities(new product sales, new markets).  
 
Among all the TCA constructs, environmental uncertainty seems to be the most 
problematic from a measurement standpoint. Specifically, there appear to be two 
competing operationalizations of this construct. The most commonly held perspective 
emphasizes the unpredictable nature of the external environment, whereas the second 
view examines both unpredictability and complexity (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997:42) 
 
The most popular operationalization of environmental uncertainty focuses on the 
unpredictability of the environment (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997:42). Buvik and John (2000) 
used four items (α =0.54) in measuring the uncertainty aspect. Items they used included;  
The demand for our end products varies continually; 
 The demand conditions for our supplier’s product are very irregular;  
Our most important competitors are regularly carrying out product adjustment and 
development of new product 
The products we purchase from our suppliers have very high innovation rates and 
short life cycles. 
 
The reliability of these elements above was quite enough, so I also used some of them in 
measuring this concept in this study. The study used three items in measuring this concept 
after performing necessary adjustment using factor loading analysis. The three items used all 
loaded into one component. Further the reliability analysis indicated α = 82.78% which is 
quite significant. KMO and Bartlett‟s test measured .859 and λ2 = 417.069 (significant at p < 
.01) respectively, implying a significant correlation of the terms in measuring the concept. 
This concept in the analysis was then be abbreviated as ENVU 
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5.3.9 Vertical coordination 
Vertical coordination is the purposive organization of the flow of activities and information 
between the transacting parties (Buvik and John 200:56). Buvik and John (2000) measured 
Vertical coordination using 5 items (α =0.78). The items used from this study also were 
extracted from works done by Heide & John (1990); Reve and Stern (1986). These items 
included;  
We regularly exchange information about production costs with this supplier;  
We regularly consult with this supplier about its selection of raw materials and 
components incorporated in the product (s) we order;  
We regularly exchange information about price development and market conditions 
with this supplier;  
We cooperate closely with this supplier on quality control of products delivered to our 
company. 
 
This study used three items in measuring this concept. By factor loading analysis the three 
items loaded into 1 component. The reliability analysis indicated alpha was at 81.59% which 
was quite significant. The results was also confirmed by KMO and Bartlett‟s test which 
measured .717 and λ2 = 97.153 (significant at p < .01), respectively signifying a very strong 
correlation of items measuring this concept. 
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5.4 SUMMARY OF MEASUREMENTS USED IN THIS STUDY. 
TABLE 4 
CONSTRUCT ITEMS 
Buyer Asset specificity 
(BUASP) 
(5 Items) 
λ2 =501.174 
p < .01 
α = 93.35% 
KMO = .796,  
1.We have made significant investment in equipment 
dedicated to our relationship with this supplier 
2. We have made extensive internal adjustments in order to 
deal effectively with this supplier 
3. Training our people to deal with this supplier has 
involved substantial commitments of time and money 
4. Our logistics system have been tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with this supplier  
 
 
Supplier Asset Specificity 
(SUASP) 
(4 Items) 
λ2 =573.517 
p < .01 
α = 95.91 
KMO = .813 
1.Supplier has trained their employees to deal with our firm 
2.Supplier has made substantial commitment of time and 
money 
3.Supplier production systems has been tailored to produce 
for our firm. 
4. Supplier logistics system have been tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with our supplies. 
Buyer perceived opportunism 
(BOPPORT) 
(5 Items) 
λ2 =1106.298 
p < .01 
α = 95.19% 
KMO = .850 
1.On occasion, this supplier lies about certain things in 
order to protect his interest. 
2. This supplier sometimes promises to do things without 
actually doing them later. 
3.This supplier does not always act in accordance with out 
contract (s). 
4. This supplier sometimes uses unexpected events to 
extract concessions from our firm. 
Behavioral uncertainty (BU) 1.We are uncertain about how our supplier organizes 
purchases used for input 
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(5 Items) 
λ2 =134.549 
p < .01 
 α = 77.61% 
KMO= .764 
 
 
2. Our knowledge about our supplier‟s production process 
is limited. 
3. We have little knowledge about the terms of trade the 
supplier offers to other buyers. 
4. It is difficult to interpret how the supplier perceives the 
present relationship with our firm. 
5. We are uncertain about supplier‟s future plans for our 
relationship. 
Performance ambiguity (PA) 
(4 Items) 
λ2 =65.647 
p < .01 
α = 70% 
KMO = .711 
1 It is inadequate to evaluate this supplier base on item(s) 
price. 
2. Evaluating the supplier‟s performance is highly complex 
process 
3. There would be significant costs associated with one-site 
monitoring of this supplier. 
4. Precise standards to assess this supplier‟s performance 
are not readily available. 
Environmental Uncertainty 
(EU) 
(3 Items)  
λ2 =417.069 
p < .01 
α = 82.78% 
KMO = .859 
1 Demand for this product varies continually. 
2. Our most important competitors are regularly carrying 
out product adjustment 
3. Product we are purchasing from this supplier have high 
innovation rate and varies continually. 
Vertical Coordination 
 (VertCoord) 
(3 Items) 
λ2 =97.153 
p < .01 
α = 81.59% 
KMO = .717 
1.We regularly exchange information on this product with 
this supplier 
2. We regularly exchange information about price 
development and market conditions with this supplier 
3. We cooperate closely with this supplier on quality 
control of product delivered to our firm. 
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Contractual Flexibility 
(CFLEX) 
(3 Items) 
λ2 = 98.234 
p < .01 
α = 78.92% 
KMO = .623 
1 Flexibility in response to request for changes is a 
characteristic of this relationship 
2. The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the 
ongoing relationship to cope with changing circumstances 
3. When some unexpected situation arises, the parties 
would rather work out a new deal than hold each other to  
Buyer dependence (BUDEP) 
(4 Items) 
λ2 =507.724 
p < .01 
α = 96.98% 
KMO = .854 
1 If we decide to stop purchasing from this supplier, we 
could easily replace this volume with purchase from 
another supplier. 
2. There are many competitive suppliers of this product  
3. Our firm will not have difficulties in using product from 
another supplier 
4. Changing to another to another supplier will require us 
less effort and cost 
Supplier dependence (SUDEP) 
(4 Items) 
λ2 =507.24 
p < .01 
α = 95.53% 
KMO = .854 
 
1 If we stopped buying from this supplier, he would easily 
replace our volume with another buyer. 
2. If we stopped buying from this supplier, he would easily 
replace our volume with another buyer. 
3. Finding another buyer would not affect the price this 
supplier charge. 
4. If the relationship is terminated, it will not hurt this 
supplier. 
Formal Contractual 
Agreements (FCA) 
(3 Items) 
λ2 =117.283 
p < .01 
α = 81.5% 
KMO = .648 
1 Firm agreements stipulate all aspects concerning 
exchange of information about price and market conditions 
between our firms. 
2. Written contracts stipulate all aspects regarding the tasks 
and influence of two parties in the quality control of the 
product we purchase from this supplier 
3. Written contracts stipulate all aspect regarding the order 
selection of sub-suppliers for the product we order from 
this supplier. 
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CHAPTER 6 
                                                DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the relations predicted in the hypothesis. The 
relationship between the variables will statistically be presented followed by brief comments, 
but the next chapter will give more literature input of the arguments that will be raised in this 
chapter. Also at the end of the analysis there will be a presentation of the summary of the 
findings.  
 
6.1 The Response Rate 
Total of 130 respondents were involved in this study, where 97 of them where able to give a 
response to the study. Out of 97, 87 were those who responded early, 10 were late respondents 
while those who did not able to respond at all were 33. The response rate was about 70%. The 
difference between early and rate respondents were insignificant. The table below presents the 
summary of response.  
TABLE 5: Response rate 
S/N Total No. of 
questionnaires 
No of 
questionnaires 
filled and 
returned 
Early 
Response 
Late 
response 
Non 
response 
Response 
rate 
  1      130          97      87    10     33     70% 
Source (Author construct from survey, 2010) 
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6.2 REGRESSION RESULTS 
6.2.1 EFFECTS ON BUYER PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM 
H1a- H1b:  Direct Effects of buyer and supplier asset specificity 
Taking model 1 in table 6 below, the direct impact of buyer asset specificity on buyer 
perceived opportunism is significant and positive (t = 3.236, p < .01). On the other hand 
supplier asset specificity was not significant in this model. Further more  Eq 1 that is 
represented by model 1 in table 6 below  was significant (R
2
 Adj = .083, F(2,95)=5.329, p 
<.01), but it did not explain more variation in comparison to model 2 which took account of 
the moderation effect of behavioral uncertainty (this will be discussed later on the mediation 
effect). The extended model 4 in table below did not significantly affect the stability of 
regression coefficients of buyer asset specificity, implying the relevance of this variable in the 
determining the relationship with buyer perceived opportunism 
TABLE 6 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUYER PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM 
 MODEL1             MODEL 2 MODEL 3          MODEL 4 
Independent 
Variables 
b t b 
 
t 
 
b t b 
 
t 
 
CONST 
BUASP 
PA 
BUASPXPA 
BU 
BUASPXBU 
SUASP 
SUASPXPA 
SUASPXBU 
9.6E-18 .00 -002 .017ns .001 .006 -.018 -.179ns 
.316 3.236** .166 1.669* .317 2.981** .203 1.829* 
- - - - .007 .068 -.094 -.710ns 
- - - - -.001 -.004* -.313 -1.489ns 
- - -.103 -1.039ns   .012 .094ns 
- - .289 2.656**   .543 2.121* 
.041 .416     -.037 -.365ns 
      -.204 .065ns 
      .193 1.308ns 
 R2 Adj =.083 
 
F (2, 95) = 5.329 
P <.01 
R2 Adj =.133 
 
F (3, 94) = 4.085 
P <.01 
 
R2 Adj =.071 
 
F (3, 94) = 3.402 
P <.05 
R2 Adj =.084 
 
F (5, 92) = 5.532 
P <.05 
Source (Author construct from survey, 2010) 
* Indicates p <.05 (two - tailed ) 
** Indicates p < .01 (two-tailed)  
Note: n.s = not significant 
                  b = Unstandardized coefficients 
                  t = t-values. 
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The implications of these findings do support H1a, which suggested buyer asset specificity to 
increase buyer perceived opportunism. This is consistency with Rokkan et al (2003) and 
Anderson (1988) on a positive coefficient of buyer asset specificity. On the other hand H1b is 
not supported as predicted  
 
H2a-H2b: The Moderating Effects of behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity 
Model 2 on table 6 above examines the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty on the 
relationship between buyer asset specificity. Eq2 will be analyzed using model2, but this 
model removed supplier asset specificity after consideration of its insignificant effect on 
buyer perceived opportunism in table 6 above and the correlation matrix table 7 below. Note 
that all the interaction variables were mean centered to reduce the problem of 
multicollinearity.  
Table7 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 BU PA BUASP SUASP BUASPX 
BU 
BUASPX 
PA 
SUASPX 
BU 
SUASPX 
PA 
BOPPORT 
BU 1 .600** .012 -.002 -.084 -.164 .406** -.061 -.155 
PA  1 .007 .158 -.194 -.331** -.055 -.201* -.114 
BUASP   1 .004 .412** .337** -.052 -.175 .234** 
SUASP    1 -.074 -.205* -.055 -.163 .928 
BUASPXBU     1 .833** -.024 -.036 .226** 
BUASPXPA      1 -.024 -.044 .215* 
SUASPXBU       1 .577** -.016 
SUASPXPA        1 -.073 
BOPPORT         1 
Means .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .0071 -.0021 .1570 .00 
Standard 
deviation 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .764 .9012 1.0858 1.0452 1.00 
Source (Author construct from survey, 2010) 
* Indicates significance at p<.05 
** Indicates significance at p<.01 
Model 2 in table 6 was found to be fit and significant (R
2
Adj = .133, F (3, 94) = 4.085, p < 
.01), meaning the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty is significant. Using behavioral 
uncertainty as a mediating variable increased the initial model‟s (direct effects of buyer asset 
specificity and supplier asset specificity) capacity by explaining more variation (13.3% versus 
8.3%). This has supported H2a meaning behavioral uncertainty has a moderation effect on the 
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relationship between buyer asset specificity and perceived opportunism. Model 3, which 
examined the moderating effect of performance ambiguity on this relationship, did not turn 
out to be very significant compared to behavioral uncertainty moderating effect though it was 
still significant. The correlation matrix table 7 above indicated this pattern as well. The 
overall model of the moderating effect of performance ambiguity was significant but it 
decreased the initial model predictions (model 2). Further more the inspection of the 
interaction terms (buyer asset specificity and performance ambiguity) was significant though 
to not very strong. This leads to partial support of H2b.From the analysis above the very 
significant model is model 2 which can be summarized as follows: 
BOPPORT =.166BUASP +.289BUASPXBU 
dBopport  =  .166 + .289BU 
dBUASP 
The figure below will help in simplifying the mathematical explanation above. 
Figure2 
IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL UNCERTAITNY ON THE RELATION BETWEEN 
BUYER ASSET SPECIFICITY AND BUYER PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (Author construct form survey, 2010) 
 
2 4 6 -2 -4 -6 
2 
4 
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-2 
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BU 
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6.2.2 EFFECTS ON VERTICAL COORDINATION 
H3: Effect of contractual flexibility 
In measuring the direct effect of contractual flexibility on vertical coordination, other 
variables were used as well so as to ensure that the true significance of this variable was not a 
result of other variables. Model 1 in table 8 used to examine Eq 4. The results has indicated 
that model 1 which uses only contractual flexibility as independent variable was significant 
and positive as predicted (R
2
Adj = .184, F (1, 96) = 22.265, P <.001).  
Implication of the findings is that contractual flexibility explains about 18.4% of the total 
variation. When asset specificity and environmental uncertainty were added in model1 (model 
2 in table 8 below) the significance did not increase but the level of variance explained 
increases (from .184 to .192). Extended model 3 did not significantly affect the stability of 
regression coefficient of contractual flexibility. H3 is supported but further discussions on 
table 8 will be on the discussion section. 
TABLE 8 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VERTICAL COORDINATION 
 MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL 3 
Independent 
variables 
b t b t b t 
CONST -9E-17 .000 -1.3E-16 .000 -.009 -.095 
CFLEX .439 4.8** .466 4.8** .454 4.8** 
BUASP - - -.055 -.583 -.061 -.66 
SUASP - - -.129 -1.163 -.165 -1.67* 
ENVU - - -.107 -1.162 -.127 -1.36 
BUASPXENU 
 
  - - -.113 -1.17 
 R2 Adj = .184 
F (1, 96) = 22.7 
P <.001 
R2 Adj = .192 
F (2, 95) = 6.721 
P <.001 
R2 Adj = .196 
F (4, 93) = 5.672 
P<.001 
Source (Author construct form survey, 2010) 
*Indicates p<.05 (One-tailed) 
**Indicates p<.01 (two-tailed) 
The inspection of correlation matrix on table 9 below indicated that contractual flexibility  is 
positively related to vertical coordination,  while supplier asset specificity was negatively 
related to this concept, but the remaining variables did not show significant correlation with 
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vertical coordination. The anticipation derived from Buvik & Grøhhaug (2000) with respect to 
positive impact of environmental uncertainty and asset specificity on vertical coordination 
was not supported but the negative effects of asset specificity that was found by Frank and 
Henderson (1992) was supported.  
TABLE 9 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1.VERTCOORD 1      
2.CONFLEX ..439** 1     
3.SUASP -.044* .205* 1    
4.BUASP -.134 .143 -.068 1   
5.ENVU -.028 .112 .069 -.024 1  
6.BUASPXENVU -.109 -.164* -.342** -.004 -.241* 1 
Source (Author construct from survey, 2010) 
*      
Significance at p < .05  
**  
 Significance at p < .001 (2-tailed) 
 
Though the focus of this analysis was not to find out the influence of these variables apart 
from contractual flexibility, but it is important to note that their inclusion are relevant due to 
the fact that this study has been done in a different setting (developing economy) where most 
literature on this subject are found in developed economies. In spite of the different location 
of the study, the prediction of the negative effect from buyer asset specificity does not 
contradict with standing literature.   
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Other effects (Asset specificity and environmental uncertainty) 
 
This study has found a negative influence of asset specificity (buyer asset specificity) on 
vertical coordination (model 3 in table 8 and correlation matrix in table 9). This negative 
effect of asset specificity does not contradict with Frank and Henderson (1992). Again the 
analysis did not found a direct significant effect of environmental uncertainty as was noted in 
Buvik & Grøhhaug (2000) and Frank and Henderson (1992).  
In spite of such results I still agree on the influence of both asset specificity and 
environmental uncertainty in the vertical coordination. For instance from Model 2 in table 8, 
the inclusion of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty raised the model prediction 
i.e. Adjusted R
2
 by .008 (from .184 to .192). On the other hand model 3, which added the 
interaction effect of buyer asset specificity and environmental uncertainty, increased the level 
of Adjusted R
2
 by .012 (from .184 to .196).  
 
6.2.3 EFFECTS ON FORMAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
H4 Effect of Environmental uncertainty 
Mode 1 in table 10 below represents equation 5 that predicted a direct environmental effect on 
forma contractual agreement. Four controlling variables (buyer asset specificity, supplier asset 
specificity, buyer dependence and supplier dependence) as well were used in table 10 below 
and four different models were tested to see which represents the concept well.  
Environmental uncertainty was significant in predicting a negative impact of on formal 
contractual agreement (t = -1.837, p < .05), but as a model it has explained very small 
percentage of total variation though significant (R
2
 = .024, F (1, 96) = 3.376).  On the other 
hand this variable does not seem to retain its significance when controlling for other variables 
and in particular buyer dependence even though the stability of regression coefficient (for 
environmental uncertainty) does not change much. 
In comparison to model 3 in table 10 above (used four variables) which explained about 25% 
of the total variation, mode 1 was less relevant though significant. The most significant 
variable found to predict formal contractual agreement was buyer dependence (see model 3 
and 4 in table 10 above). When buyer dependence is used together with environmental 
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uncertainty and other controlling variables, the only significant variable in the model is buyer 
dependence (this is true both in model 3 and 4 in table 10 above).  
TABLE 10 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FORMAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent 
variables 
b t b t b t b t 
 
CONST -6.1E-18 .000 -8.8E-18 .000 -5E-18 .000 .006 .07 
ENVU -.185 -1.837* -.162 -1.65* -.136 -1.53* -.123 -1.327 
Controlling 
Variables 
        
BUASP - - .261 2.659** .115 1.204 .111 1.099 
SUASP - - .119 1.214 .107 1.207 .126 1.360 
BUDEP     -.446 .096** -.445 -4.6** 
SUDEP       .015 .167 
 R2 Adj = .024 
F (1, 96) = 3.376 
P < .05 
R2 Adj = .085 
F (3, 94) = 3.971 
P < .01 
R2 Adj = .249 
F (5, 92) = 7.367 
P < .01 
R2 Adj = .238 
F (7, 90) = 5.28 
P < .01 
Source (Author construct from survey, 2010) 
*Indicates P < .05 (one-tailed) 
**Indicates p < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
Apart from the results in table 10 above, the correlation matrix table 11 below highlights the 
contribution of each variable used in the model on the dependent variable as well as the 
relationship between the variables themselves. The results support the findings observed from 
model 3 and 4 in table 10 above signifying a very significant negative impact of buyer 
dependence and in addition buyer asset specificity was significantly negatively correlated 
with formal contractual agreement.  
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Also environmental uncertainty was found to be significantly negatively related to formal 
contractual agreement as was predicted in H4. The findings though support H4 the effect of 
buyer dependence is strongly significant. 
TABLE 11 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. BUASP 1 .004 -.3** .122 -.08  .28** 
2.SUASP  1 -.022 .061 .051 .112 
3.BUDEP   1 .143 .083 -.5** 
4.SUDEP    1 -.04 -.025 
5.ENVU     1 -.178* 
6.FCA      1 
Mean .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Standard 
deviation 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source (Author construct from survey, 2010) 
*Indicates P < .05 (one-tailed) 
**Indicates p < .01 (2-tailed) 
H5: Controlling for effect of asset specificity 
When a buyer or supplier commits specific assets into a relationship, he will expect to put 
safeguard to these assets through formalization of contracts. The findings support this 
hypothesis by showing a significant positive beta value of buyer asset specificity (2.67, p < 
.01). This is as well consistency with Buvik & Reve (2002). Again the model 2 (R
2
 Adj =. 085  
F (3, 94) = 3.971, p < .01), which did not include the aspect of buyer dependence was 
significance more than model 1  (which had only environmental uncertainty), by increase of 
Adj R
2
 of about .061. This increase is very large suggesting that the inclusion of asset specify 
in the model was quite relevant.  
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H6: Controlling the effect of buyer dependence 
The effect of buyer dependence was predicted to negatively affect the formal contractual 
agreements because the buyer will be in disadvantaged position with respect to negotiations. 
This study has supported this argument by the use of model 3 (R
2
 Adj = .249, F (5, 92) = 
7.367, p < .01) in table 10. The effect of buyer dependence in the model was very robust 
(increased Adj R
2
 by .164) This suggest that buyer dependence has a very strong negative 
effect on formal contractual agreement than environmental uncertainty itself and asset 
specificity combined. The other side of this implication is that environmental uncertainty and 
asset specificity stop to be determinants of formal contractual agreement when there is buyer 
dependence. The findings are still consistency with Buvik & Rev (2002) with respect to 
strong negative effect of buyer dependence on formal contractual agreement. 
6.3 Summary of findings 
Table 12 
HYPOTHESIS RESULTS 
H1a Supported 
H1b Not supported 
H2a supported 
H2b Partial Supported 
H3 Supported 
H4 Supported 
H5 Supported 
H6 Supported 
Source (Author construct from analysis, 2010) 
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CHAPTER 7 
 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
 
7.0 Introduction:  
This chapter will present the discussion on the analysis made in chapter 6. There will be a 
discussion for each concept that was measured i.e. buyer perceived opportunism, vertical 
coordination and formal contractual agreement. Further this chapter will draw some 
theoretical and practical implications and final close the subject by a conclusive remark. 
7. 1 BUYER PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM 
Buyer perceived opportunism was found to be increased by presence of buyer asset specificity 
as was assumed in the H1a. Further the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty was found 
to be significant (model 2 and 3 in table 6) and it also improved the level of variance 
explained in comparison to model 1 in table 6 which had only buyer asset specificity as 
independent variable. Again the results from the mediation effect of behavioral uncertainty on 
the relationship between buyer asset specificity and perceived opportunism were as well in 
accordance to predictions in H2a. Both in table 6 and 7, the direct effect of supplier asset 
specificity on buyer perceived opportunism was not significant, implying that H1b was not 
supported. The extended model 4 in table 6 did not affect the regression coefficients of buyer 
asset specificity, implying the significance of this variable in predicting opportunism. 
Behavioral uncertainty as an individual variable did not have any significance impact on the 
buyer perceived opportunism nor performance ambiguity. The correlation matrix in table 7 
indicated performance ambiguity and behavioral uncertainty to be moderately related (.600), 
but this still this did not account for a problem of multicollinearity because the level of 
association did not exceed the cutting point of +/-.600 as suggested by Hair et al (2007). The 
moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity in the relation 
between asset specificity and buyer perceived opportunism were significant in support of H2a 
and H2b, but the effect of behavioral uncertainty was larger than that of performance 
ambiguity. Moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty (model 2 in table 6) was able to 
explain about 13.3% of the total variation, where the effect of performance ambiguity as a 
moderating effect was able to explain 7.1% of the variation which is smaller even than the 
direct effect of buyer asset specificity (model 1 in table 6) that explained about 8.3%. With 
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same respect, the extended model 4 in table 6 did not affect strongly the stability of regression 
coefficients for the interaction between buyer asset specificity though there were slightly 
improvements. The results from table 6 that showed a less moderating effect of performance 
ambiguity as compared to behavioral uncertainty as well as the results from the correlation 
matrix on table 7 that indicated a very close association between behavioral uncertainty and 
performance ambiguity. It will be logical to reduce the model of buyer perceived opportunism 
to include buyer asset specificity and the interaction effect of buyer asset specificity with 
behavioral uncertainty (see model 2 in table 6). The reduced model is what was summarized 
in figure 2, which involved a relationship between a partial derivative of buyer perceived 
opportunism per buyer asset specificity versus behavioral uncertainty.  
The results do not refute Demsetz Harold (1991) and Rokklan et al (2003) findings on the 
mixed results of asset specificity role on perceived opportunism. The assumption regarding 
supplier asset specificity on a relation will result into reduced buyer perceived opportunism. 
The findings indicated a negative standardized beta value of supplier asset specificity on the 
relation but this was not significant. By no support of the hypothesis regarding supplier asset 
specificity role in reducing buyer perceived opportunism, does not make conclusive argument 
because other methodological approach or another setting different from Tanzania 
environment might yield a different result. I do also argue that buyer perceived opportunism 
might be reduced by other factors which are considered to be more important in social- 
economic setting of Tanzania. 
7.2 VERTICAL COORDINATION: 
The result from table 8 has supported the H3 on a positive impact of contractual flexibility on 
vertical coordination. Model 1 in table 8 with only contractual flexibility as a predictor 
variable was very significant than all models in terms of F value (22.7, p < .001), and it was 
able to explain about 18.4% of the total variation though there were slightly increments of 
.008 when asset specificity and environmental uncertainty were added (model 2 in table 8), 
and .012 when the interaction effect of buyer asset specificity and environmental uncertainty 
were added (model 3 in table 8).   
While in model 1 and 2 the effect of asset specificity on vertical coordination was not 
significant, the results from extended model 3 in table 8 indicate that supplier asset specificity 
has a negative impact on vertical coordination which was consistent with Frank and 
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Henderson (1992. The results from this extended model have also indicated that regression 
coefficient for contractual flexibility was very stable. Correlation matrix in table 9 has well 
indicated a significant negative impact of supplier asset specificity on vertical coordination. 
For me it seems most small business firms in Tanzania due to their small size relative to the 
supplying firms (manufactures/distributors) their investment in asset specificity has less role 
to influence the type of relations but the suppliers have more voice on this and when these 
suppliers put their specific assets they will likely want to ensure that they are safe through 
other forms of governance. I do further suggest the inclusion of different types of asset 
specificity as was in Frank and Henderson (1992), so as to capture the detailed explanation of 
this variable on vertical coordination.  
On the other hand environmental uncertainty did not turn out to support positively the idea of 
vertical coordination as anticipated from literature, but for me it seems the buying firms are 
more concerned with flexibility less than environmental changes when it comes to vertical 
coordination.  
7.3 FORMAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS 
The prediction from H4 on a negative effect of environmental uncertainty on formal 
contractual agreement was supported though the use of this variable as a predictor of this 
relationship will increase when asset specificity is added but the effects of both wears off 
when controlling for buyer dependence. A point of notice is that environmental uncertainty 
when it is used by itself in determining or predicting formal contractual relation (model 1 in 
table 10) it explain very little variation though significant (R
2
Adj = .024, F (1, 96) = 3.376, p 
< .05). The other aspect to note in the findings is that buyer asset specificity has a positive 
impact on formal contractual agreement, implying that when buyer make specific 
investments, they will try to safeguard them through formalization of contracts. When buyer 
asset specificity is used together with environmental uncertainty (model 2 in table 10), the 
impact improve slightly (Adjusted R
2 
increase by .061). The findings from extended model 3 
in table 10, which showed a very significance role of buyer dependence, changed the previous 
results by implying a non significance (though the regression coefficients were relatively 
stable) impact of both environmental uncertainty and buyer asset specificity when there is 
buyer dependence. This suggests a very strong negative impact of buyer dependence on the 
formal contractual agreement [consistent with Buvik & Rev, (2002)] which outweigh even the 
influence of environmental uncertainty and buyer asset specificity. In most business relations 
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in developing economies where small and medium businesses are dominated by large few 
players as large enterprises especially in the source of distribution chains, the expectation is 
more of buyer dependence, and this minimizes the use of formal contractual agreements. The 
correlation matrix in table11 confirmed contractual flexibility, buyer asset specificity and 
buyer dependence to be significantly correlated with formal contractual agreement. 
I do also argue that these findings could be better modified in a situation where environmental 
uncertainty is broken down into sub components like technical uncertainty and volume 
uncertainty or changeability  
The role of environmental uncertainty on formal contractual agreement was found to be 
negative in this study. The findings do not contradict with findings from other studies on this 
construct. Nakhla (2003) and Ivens (2005) found environmental uncertainty to be having 
negative consequences on formal contractual agreements. This is due to the fact that when 
environment is very uncertain; there will be frequent modifications of these contracts, 
something which is problematic for parties in the contract. The two studies mentioned above 
were done in developed nations, but still their findings are significant in Tanzania, which is 
regarded as emerging economy.  
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7.4 Conclusion 
Buyer asset specificity was found to increase buyer perceived opportunism as was predicted 
in H1a, but the predictions from H1b concerning supplier asset specificity to reduce buyer 
perceived opportunism was not supported. On the other hand the moderating effects of 
behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity on the relationship between asset 
specificity and buyer perceived opportunism were significantly supported (H2a and H2b) as 
well but with some implications. The implication drawn from these two variables (behavioral 
uncertainty and performance ambiguity) resulted from their close association (see correlation 
matrix on table7) on which behavioral uncertainty was having stronger mediation impact on 
the model (see model 2 in table 6) than performance ambiguity. This in turn suggest in spite 
support for these hypothesis, a mediation model should consider behavioral uncertainty and 
the resulted model will include buyer asset specificity and interaction effect of buyer asset 
specificity and behavioral uncertainty. It should as well be noted that the individual variables 
used for mediation were not having direct significant impact on buyer perceived opportunism, 
but it was through their interaction effect.    
On the other hand contractual flexibility was found to have a significant positive effect on 
vertical coordination as predicted in H3. The findings suggested that contractual flexibility by 
itself when it is used as independent variable (see model 1 in table 8), is able to account about 
18.4% of the total variation, but it is important to note the slightly improvement of the model 
with the inclusion of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty. With regard to asset 
specificity, it seems buyer asset specificity does not have a direct influence on vertical 
coordination but supplier asset specificity has a significant negative association with it. The 
negative effect of supplier asset specificity did not contradict with literature [negative effect 
was observed by Frank and Henderson (1992)]. On the other hand environmental uncertainty 
did not show a direct positive effect predicted by Buvik & Grøhhaug (2000) but the 
differences in results might be due to the differences perceived environmental uncertainties 
from firms in Tanzania versus those which are in developed economies. 
Furthermore the predicted negative effect environmental uncertainty and a positive effect of 
asset specificity together with a negative effect of buyer dependence on formal contractual 
agreement was in accordance to predictions in H4, H5 and H6. A key note to take in to 
consideration is on the huge control effect of buyer dependence which wears out the 
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significance of environmental uncertainty and asset specificity in determining formal 
contractual agreement (see model 2 in table 8)   
The study has been able to find a lot of consistency pattern of results as it was predicted by 
other literatures in the western settings, implying the strength of standing TCA literature in 
predicting business to business relations in developing economies though with some slightly 
deviations. With respect to environmental uncertainty impact on vertical coordination that 
also might be as well be influenced by firm perception on this variable, the nature of 
institutions as well as nature of business and relations. The other side of argument is that 
small and medium enterprises do not contradict with most of the findings from literature, 
meaning size of the business had not changed the prediction from literature regarding the 
direction of relations highlighted above.  
The study is one of very rare studies in my country that had gone outside individual to 
business relations into business to business relations, bringing together small medium and 
large enterprises. Though two effects had been surrounded this study setting i.e. aspect of 
business size and institutional differences, still most of predicted relations do hold the same, 
indicating that a body of literature which has hugely centered in developing economies 
involving big manufacturing business to business relations, could be applicable in developing 
economies though with some careful consideration especially the business specifics and 
institutional specific factors. 
 
Again as many other studies suggest the influence of other factors such as culture, governance 
and other institutional settings on TCA, I do suggest other studies to incorporate these other 
issues and find out their strength of impact on most literature predictions which have not 
included them 
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7.5 Implication on the Further Research 
7.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
Though this study did not obtain a significant impact of supplier asset specificity on buyer 
perceived opportunism, I do suggest further studies to use more constructs on this term and 
even more sample size. With respect to environmental uncertainty, I do suggest for further 
break down of this variable to reflect more focus like volume, technology, or changeability 
and then these small components to be used to test the predicted relations. 
This study used buyer as a respondent, but I do propose for other studies to use supplier as a 
respondent or combination of both so as to reflect another alternative approach for measuring 
the predicted relations. The involvement of different sizes of business I do suggest to involve 
at least equal samples so as to have more representatives for each business size. This will lead 
into a more systematic analysis of the influence of size on the TCA predictions. Another issue 
will be to test size against other relations, because in this study size did not significantly affect 
predicted relations. 
In relations to findings in the study, I propose the analysis on buyer perceived opportunism to 
consider the use of behavioral uncertainty instead of combining it with performance 
ambiguity because these two terms are significantly related. The capacity for behavioral 
uncertainty to have stronger mediation effect than performance ambiguity, might suggest that 
performance ambiguity is a concept embedded in behavioral uncertainty, something which 
will require further examination on these two variables.  
Furthermore, with respect to vertical coordination in I do suggest other studies to break down 
asset specificity into specific types [as was in Frank and Henderson (1992)].  Also I do 
suggest more findings to be done on how businesses in developing economies perceive 
environmental uncertainty because the way they perceive it, may have implication in 
explaining the deviation found with respect to its impact on vertical coordination. Again I 
would suggest the model regarding formal contractual agreement especially in developing 
economies to try in adding other social-cultural perspectives because these are assumed to 
influence the formality of contracts. 
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7.5.2 Policy Implications 
 
In developing economies networks and business groups formulates a very important self 
enforcement mechanism when it comes to issues related to buyer-supplier relations in 
business to business relation. Biggs & Shah, (2006) recognized the role of these networks and 
business groups. Because specific investment committed by the buyer in the relationship will 
likely raise his level of perceived opportunism, the governing institutions in the developing 
countries particularly in Tanzania can encourage business forums, which will link the buyers 
and suppliers in a place where they can have close networks or develop some kind of relations 
so as to minimize their perceived opportunism through confidence building with their 
partners. The large enterprises can do that but when there are small and medium enterprises, 
things do not work automatically. Focus could be to continue to use the self enforcement 
mechanism to be a key solution in solving business to business opportunism problems, but the 
mechanism to achieve this could be facilitated by policy makers. 
In developing economies like Tanzania, where most of business organizations are small and 
medium, buyer dependence is expected to exist in large extent. This situation suggest to 
impact negatively on the formality of contract at the extent that environmental uncertainty 
becomes insignificant. Dealing with such challenges of informality, the government could 
encourage small businesses to formulate corporations or associations that will give them voice 
to solve such expected existence of informality in business dealings which in most cases 
cannot be well resolved in courts.  
Since most of findings does not contradict with predictions from most of western settings, 
there is a room for developing economies to benefit from most of findings with respect to 
relations predicted by different TCA dimensions, but again this should involve some 
feasibility or preliminary studies to remove out the strong effect of other factors which were 
not included in those former studies. 
SMEs policies should as well take into account the aspect of TCA dimensions and their 
relation with other dimensions or concepts so as to give a holistic approach. 
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7.5.3 Managerial Implications 
 
Since buyer will more likely increase his perceived opportunism when he commits specific 
assets, managers in supplier firms can use different approaches to lower this perceived 
opportunism such as cross investing on the buyer together with close social corporations 
(though this was not significantly supported in this study). One of the approach noted by 
(Stump and Heide 1996) on how to manage the problem caused by specific investments is to 
design an incentive structure that discourages opportunistic behavior by the other party. 
Manager in the buying side could consider establishing other safeguarding mechanisms like 
contracts especially when the situation is surrounded by behavioral uncertainty because the 
interaction effect with buyer asset specificity will likely heighten the perceived opportunism 
by the buyer. With respect to formation of contracts, when buyer is in a dependence position, 
he/she need to formulate or join in some sort of associations that will help him/her to have 
command over powerful suppliers.  
 
Managers has to consider the use of contractual flexibility in improving inter-business 
relations, though this should be carefully practiced by ensuring the asset specificity is not 
involved because it will have a negative association with regard to such a hybrid relation (at 
least as predicted in this study). On the other hand, the formal contractual agreement can be 
used in addition to contractual flexibility in an event buyer decide to commit specific 
investment in a balanced relation.    
Managers in small business firms especially in Tanzania should expect to prepare their mind 
in dealing with contractual informality because of existence of buyer dependence by strategic 
mitigation of the situation through use of socially enforcement mechanisms or joining in the 
small business associations so as to have added power in informally resolving business to 
business related problems. 
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Appendix 1 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. Business name.................................... (Option) 
2. Year of establishment.............................. 
3. Business annual turnover (TSHS) 
 up to 5 million 
 5-200 million 
 200-800 million 
 Above 800 million 
4. How many employees‟ does your firm has 
 Below 5 
 5-10 
 10-15 
 15-20 
 above 20 
5. How much do you buy from this supplier per year (approximately?) 
………………………………………………………………. 
6.  How often do you receive the supplies from this supplier? 
          (Choose one category and indicate number of times) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Category 
 Monthly Annually 
Number of times   
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7.  Statements below give a description on investment made by you or the supplier in the 
relationship. Please rank them to the extent they give accurate description (1-comletely 
inaccurate, 7-Completely accurate). 
 
By your firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We have made significant 
investment in equipment 
dedicated to our relationship 
with this supplier. 
       
We have made extensive 
internal adjustments in order to 
deal effectively with this 
supplier. 
       
Training our people to deal with 
this supplier has involved 
substantial commitments of time 
and money. 
       
Our logistics system have been 
tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with 
this supplier. 
       
By the supplier        
Supplier have trained their 
employee to deal with our firm 
       
Supplier has made substantial 
commitment of time and money  
       
Supplier production system has 
been tailored to produce for our 
firm 
       
Supplier logistics system have 
been tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with our 
firm. 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
8. Following statements relates to how your firm views the supplier firm. Please give a 
rank to an extent which you think they give an accurate description (1-Completely 
inaccurate, 7- Completely accurate). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
On occasion, this supplier lies 
about certain thing in order to 
protect his interest. 
       
This supplier sometimes 
promises to do things without 
actually doing them later 
       
This supplier does not always 
act in accordance with our 
contract (s). 
       
This supplier sometimes tries to 
breach informal agreements we 
have made to maximize his 
benefit. 
       
This supplier sometimes uses 
unexpected events to extract 
concessions from our firm. 
       
9. Statements below relates to form of relationship between your firm and supplier‟s firm. 
Please rank them to the extent which you accept them (1-completely disagree, 7- 
Completely agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We regularly exchange 
information on this product with 
this supplier  
       
We regularly exchange 
information about price 
development and market 
conditions with this supplier 
       
We cooperate closely with this 
supplier on quality control of 
product delivered to our firm 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
10. To what extent does the statement below give a description of the flexibility between 
your firm and this supplier? (1-Completely inaccurate, 7-Completely accurate). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Flexibility in response to request 
for changes is a characteristic of 
this relationship 
       
The parties expect to be able to 
make adjustments in the ongoing 
relationship to cope with 
changing circumstances 
       
When some unexpected situation 
arises, the parties would rather 
work out a new deal than hold 
each other to the original terms. 
       
 
11. To which extent does the statement below gives an accurate description of your 
dependence on this supplier (1-Completely inaccurate, 7-completely accurate) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If we decide to stop purchasing from 
this supplier, we could easily replace 
their volume with purchase from 
another supplier 
       
There are many competitive suppliers 
of this product 
       
Our firm does not have difficulties in 
using product from another suppliers 
       
Changing to another supplier will 
require us less effort and cost 
       
If we stopped buying from this 
supplier, he would easily replace our 
volume with another buyer 
       
It is relatively easy for this supplier to 
find another buyer for this products 
       
Finding another buyer would not 
affect the price this supplier charge 
       
If the relationship is terminated, it will 
not hurt this supplier. 
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12. The below statements relates to contractual relations between your firm and the supplier. 
Rank the statements to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1- Completely 
disagree, 7-Completely agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Firm agreements stipulate all aspects 
concerning exchange of information 
about price and market condition 
between our firms 
       
Written contracts stipulate all aspects 
regarding the tasks and influence of 
two parties in the quality control of 
the products we purchase from this 
supplier. 
       
Written contracts stipulate all aspects 
regarding the selection of sub-
suppliers for the products we order 
from this supplier. 
       
 
13. Following statements below give description on the behavior uncertainty of the supplier. 
Please rank the accuracy of these statements (1-Completely inaccurate, 7-Completely 
accurate). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We are uncertain about how our 
supplier organizes purchases used for 
input 
       
Our knowledge about our supplier‟s 
production process is limited 
       
We have little knowledge about the 
terms of trade the supplier offers to 
other buyers 
       
It is difficult to interpret how the 
supplier perceives the present 
relationship with our firm. 
       
We are uncertain about our supplier‟s 
future plans for our relationship. 
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14. Following statements relates to performance measurement. Please rank then to the extent 
on which you agree or disagree with tem (1-Completely disagree, 2-Completely agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is inadequate to evaluate this 
supplier based on item(s) price. 
       
It is difficult to verify whether this 
supplier is performing all of its 
contractual obligations under this 
agreement 
       
Evaluating the supplier‟s 
performance is highly complex 
process 
       
It is difficult to verify whether this 
supplier is performing all of its 
contractual obligations. 
       
There would be significant costs 
associated with one-site monitoring 
of the supplier 
       
Precise standards to assess this 
supplier‟s performance is not readily 
available. 
       
 
15. The statements below measures the environmental variations (uncertainty). Please rank 
these statements at the extent which you agree or disagree with them (1-Completely disagree, 
7-Compleltely agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Demand for this product varies 
continually. 
       
The demand conditions for our 
supplier‟s product are very irregular. 
       
Our most important competitors are 
regularly carrying out product 
adjustment. 
       
Product we are purchasing from the 
supplier have high innovation rate and 
varies continually. 
       
 
 
THANK YOU! 
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APPENDIX II 
Analytical results from SPSS 
 
 
                                                
TABLE I: Impact of asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty on buyer perceived 
opportunism 
  
 
DEPENTENT VARIABLE: BUYER PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM 
 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
    B Std. Error Beta     Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) ,001 ,098   ,015 ,988     
  BUASP ,112 ,100 ,203 1,829 ,041 ,966 1,036 
  BU -,195 ,100 -,195 -1,952 ,054 ,970 1,031 
  BUASPx BU ,260 ,110 ,240 2,367 ,020 ,938 1,066 
 
 
  
TABLE II: Impact of contractual flexibility, asset specificity and environmental 
uncertainty on Vertical Coordination. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VERTICAL COORDINATION  
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
    B Std. Error Beta     Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -,003 ,102   -,033 ,974     
  CONFLEX ,465 ,195 ,465 4.886 ,000 ,908 1,101 
  BUASP ,098 ,103 ,098 ,946 ,347 ,974 1,027 
  SUASP -,157 ,105 -,157 -1,492 ,069 ,893 1,120 
  ENVU -,160 ,106 -,160 -1,514 ,133 ,932 1,073 
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TABLE IIIa: Impact of environmental uncertainty and buyer asset specificity on formal 
contractual agreements. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FORMAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT  
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
    B Std. Error Beta     Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -3,135E-17 ,097   ,000 1,000     
  ENVU -,165 ,098 -,165 -1,684 ,096 ,994 1,006 
  BUASP ,262 ,098 ,262 2,673 ,009 ,994 1,006 
 
 
TABLE IIIb: The effect of buyer dependence on relationship above 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FORMAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
  
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
    B Std. Error Beta     Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -2,708E-17 ,087   ,000 1,000     
  ENVU -,150 ,088 -,150 -1,704 ,092 ,993 1,007 
  BUASP ,116 ,093 ,116 1,244 ,217 ,889 1,125 
  BUDEP -,448 ,093 -,448 -4,818 ,000 ,891 1,122 
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APPENDIX III 
Factor Analysis Results 
                                                
 BUYER ASSET SPECIFICITY   
 
TABLE IV: Total Variance Explained 
 
Componen
t 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3,361 84,022 84,022 3,361 84,022 84,022 
2 ,510 12,755 96,777       
3 ,101 2,534 99,311       
4 ,028 ,689 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
TABLE V: Component Matrix  
  Component 
  1 
We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to 
our relationship with this supplier 
,763 
We have made extensive internal adjustments in order to deal 
effectively with this supplier ,971 
Training our people to deal with this supplier has involved 
substantial commitments of time and money 
,974 
Our logistics system have been tailored to meet the requirements 
of dealing with this supplier 
,941 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a 1 components extracted. 
 
TABLE VI: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. ,796 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-
Square 
501,174 
df 6 
Sig. ,000 
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SUPPLIER ASSET SPECIFICITY 
 
TABLE VII: Total Variance Explained 
   
Componen
t 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3,570 89,242 89,242 3,570 89,242 89,242 
2 ,300 7,496 96,738       
3 ,112 2,800 99,538       
4 ,018 ,462 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
  
TABLE VIII: Component Matrix 
 
  Component 
  1 
Supplier has trained their employees to deal with our 
firm ,973 
Supplier has made substantial commitment of time and 
money ,878 
Supplier production systems has been tailored to 
produce for our firm ,940 
Supplier logistics system have been tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with our supplier ,984 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
 
TABLE IX 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. ,813 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-
Square 
573,517 
df 6 
Sig. ,000 
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PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM 
TABLE X: Total Variance Explained 
  
 
Componen
t 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4,278 85,562 85,562 4,278 85,562 85,562 
2 ,665 13,307 98,868       
3 ,039 ,785 99,653       
4 ,012 ,237 99,890       
5 ,005 ,110 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
TABLE XI: Component Matrix 
  
  Component 
  1 
On occasion, this supplier lies about certain 
things in order to protect his interest. ,630 
This supplier sometimes promises to do things 
without actually doing them later ,980 
This supplier does not always act in 
accordance with our contract (s). ,990 
This supplier sometimes tries to breach 
informal agreements we have made to 
maximize his benefits ,983 
This supplier sometimes uses unexpected 
events to extract concessions from our firm. 
,988 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a 1 components extracted. 
 
TABLE XII: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. ,850 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-
Square 
1106,29
8 
df 10 
Sig. ,000 
 
